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The Gang Truce as a Form of Violence Intervention *Technical Report*

July 2015

The Gang Truce as a Form of Violence Intervention

Technical Report

SolucionES Project:

Cooperation Agreement No. AID-519-A-12-00003

Coordination:

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San Salvador, El Salvador C.A, 2015

363.25
K19g Katz, Charles Max, 1969-
sv The gang truce as a form of violence intervention [recurso electrónico] :
implications for policy and practice / Charles Max Katz, Luis Enrique Amaya.
-- 1ª. ed. -- San Salvador, El Salv. : FUNDE, 2015.
1 recurso electrónico (140 p. : gráficos, tablas).

Datos electrónicos (1 archivo : pdf, 2 mb.). --
<http://www.repo.funde.org/>

ISBN 9789996149306 (E-Book, inglés)

1. Violencia-Prevención. 2. Seguridad social. 3. Violencia-Aspectos sociales.
I. Amaya, Luis Enrique, 1978- coaut. II. Título.

BINA/jmh

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This document was made possible through the generous support of the people of the United States of America through the United States Agency for International Development under cooperation agreement no. AID-519-A-12-00003. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government. The research was also funded, in part, by the ASU Foundation through a generous gift by the Watts Family. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the ASU Foundation or the Watts Family. We would also like to acknowledge support from Dr. Anthony Harriott who provided data and contextual support from Jamaica, John Maisto who assisted with data acquisition in Honduras, Eric Hedberg who provided statistical assistance, and Andrew Fox, Cher Stuewe-Portnoff, Beto Brunn, Giuliano Perseu, Juan Melendez, Patricia Valdes, Tim Nelson and Lidia Nuno for their helpful comments and suggestions throughout the project.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

While there is much literature describing the assumptions, issues, and effectiveness of crime suppression (e.g., Decker, 2003; Decker and Reed, 2002; Katz and Webb, 2006; McCorkle and Miethe, 2002) and prevention strategies (Esbensen and Osgood, 1997), much less attention has been paid to gang intervention programming, particularly gang truces. Little is known about how often gang truces occur, what conditions give rise to them, the role of third parties in brokering them, their transformative effects, and their effectiveness. In this policy brief, sponsored by SolucionES¹ and conducted by FUNDE, a member of the SolucionES Alliance with Arizona State University, we systematically evaluate gang truces; including reviewing prior research and presenting evidence on the effectiveness of gang truces that have been implemented in El Salvador, Honduras, and Jamaica for the purpose of identifying lessons learned should other governments or donors wish to support gang truces in these or other countries.

Summary of Findings

We found that the truce in El Salvador resulted in a reduction in homicides that was not the product of other trends or temporal factors. Thus, the truce in this country had a short-term effect in reducing the lethality of violent crime, though not necessarily in other dimensions of insecurity. By contrast, the truces in Jamaica and Honduras resulted in no impact on violence. The Jamaican and Honduran experiences therefore mirror the results of prior gang truces that

¹ SolucionES is multifaceted violence prevention program being implemented by an Alliance of five leading Salvadoran non-profit organizations who have come together to prevent crime and violence. The Alliance members are: Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE), Fundación Salvadoreña para la Salud y el Desarrollo Humano (FUSAL), Fundación Crisálida (known locally as Glasswing), Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (FUSADES), and Fundación Empresarial para el Desarrollo Educativo (FEPADE) with partial funding from USAID/El Salvador. Together, these five organizations have widely-recognized expertise in education, health, community development, economic development, research, and youth leadership; they are bringing their combined synergy and strengths to prevent crime and violence in El Salvador. SolucionES is using a three-pronged strategy to prevent crime and violence in El Salvador: 1) Strengthen municipal crime and violence prevention capabilities and actions, 2) Increase social investment by the private sector to prevent crime and violence, and 3) Research, publish, and disseminate findings to inform decision-making on crime and violence prevention. This is one of 10 planned policy-oriented studies. The full study is available on request.

have been studied to various extents, including those in Los Angeles and Trinidad and Tobago. Important differences in how the various truces were negotiated may explain the different results and one important difference – the ability of government and non-gang community stakeholders to promise and immediately produce measurable deliverables – appear to be especially significant.

Prior Evaluations of Gang Truces

Little research to date has examined the effectiveness of gang truces, and much of the research that does exist has been restricted to the field of public health. Studies of a gang truce in South Central Los Angeles between the Crips and Bloods by Cotton (1992) and Ordog et al. (1993; 1995) found temporary reductions in the number of homicides and gunshot wounds during the truce, but these studies failed to point out that despite about a 35 percent decrease in

homicides for the first three months of the truce, homicides then doubled in months four through eleven, compared with the pre-truce period.

Similar findings were reported in Trinidad and Tobago (Maguire, Katz and Wilson, 2013), where violence declined for a brief period of time (again, for about three months), but then increased substantially over the long term (12 months). These results suggest that gang truces may produce short-term benefits, yet result in long-term adverse consequences.

Additionally these studies have suffered from a variety of flaws, including: 1) poor theoretical assumptions about gangs, including often ignoring that they might have the organizational structure and internal discipline to enforce their truces; 2) relatively weak evaluation designs that fail to account for other potential causes for,

What is a Gang Truce?

A gang truce is a nonviolent resolution to a larger conflict between groups that has an impact on general levels of violence and other forms of criminality within a community (Ordog et al., 1993; 1995; Whitehill et al. 2012). It differs from conflict interruption, resolution or mediation efforts, which seek to rapidly intervene, typically through outreach workers or violence interruption specialists, in episodic violent events between groups in a community. Gang truces often involve dialogue and negotiations between multiple parties (e.g., gangs, government, NGO's, religious organizations) that seek to recalibrate the norms of conflict within and between groups for the purpose of reducing or eliminating violence and other crime.

or broader trends related to, violence reductions; 3) a failure to examine the processes involved in creating gang truces; 4) a failure to examine unintended consequences of the truces beyond their impact on gun violence; and 5) a lack of sophisticated statistical analysis capable of discerning overall trends, cyclic patterns, outliers, and turning points.

Overview of Study Design

This policy brief examines gang truces implemented in El Salvador, Jamaica, and Honduras including the processes undertaken with and between gangs and other stakeholders. We collected information about the processes associated with each gang truce from a variety of sources, including peer reviewed articles, books, reports, local newspaper articles, and interviews of persons with first-hand knowledge about the gang truce in each nation. We examined the impact of each truce using official data. We first performed a simple t-test comparing the homicide rates before and after the truce. We then employed time series models not used in other studies to evaluate homicide rates as a function of time, with truce period indicators included to measure the effect of the truce net of the temporal trends. We also employed supplemental models to examine and control for factors other than the truce that might have affected homicides over the study period.

Research Findings

Implementing a Gang Truce

The gang truces studied have a number of common characteristics. First, in each case a community was experiencing an uncharacteristically high number of gang related homicides over a fairly lengthy period of time, which resulted in each community placing strong pressure on the government in general and the justice system in particular to respond to the problem quickly and effectively. Second, each community had first attempted, unsuccessfully, to control gang violence through suppression-oriented strategies. Third, each community's inability to exercise traditional informal and formal social control to decrease levels of violence became self-evident to the public and government. This resulted in all involved stakeholders wanting to seek (or participate in) an alternative strategy in which brokers would formally and/or informally work directly with gang leaders to establish a truce that would reduce homicides.

Key stakeholders involved in the negotiation and establishment of each gang truce were also somewhat similar. In each case examined, the leaders of the largest and most violently involved gangs were willing to participate. ***In each of these cases it was clear that the gangs sought to collaborate with the brokers not only for the purpose of reducing violence, but perhaps more importantly as a means to gain greater, more positive recognition in the community and to reap some form of benefit to themselves, their members, and perhaps their community.*** In each case, while not always formally involved, government officials were at a minimum made aware of negotiations, and in some cases solicited the assistance of third parties to broker an agreement between stakeholders. In each case it was at least implicitly understood that the government would “listen” to the gang leader’s expectations and offers. We found that when the government was no longer willing to “listen” to or collaborate with brokers, the truce processes ended abruptly. Brokers were typically comprised of a very small group (i.e., 2-3) of individuals who were perceived to be “honest brokers.” In El Salvador and Honduras this included a high ranking Catholic Church official, a leader from an international diplomatic organization (i.e., OAS), and other neutral parties. In Jamaica this included a quasi-governmental organization that had been established for the purpose of brokering negotiations between gangs for the purpose of reducing violence, as well as the local university, which had access to staff who were perceived to be neutral but had an interest in reducing violence near the university.

The strategies used to execute each gang truce were generally similar, but had important differences. Each involved a team of brokers working to identify common goals to be achieved and tangibles that could be delivered to the gang in exchange for the gang achieving the stated goals. They differed by how each party’s promise was delivered. In Honduras and Jamaica, gang leaders traded violence reduction pledges for long-term government and social changes, such as the development of substantial public works programs to reduce unemployment. In Honduras and Jamaica, the government was asked to develop and deploy large scale social programming in a short time frame—something for which neither country had a strong track record. In El Salvador, by contrast, brokers secured promises for immediate changes in gang behavior in exchange for feasible immediate deliverables from the government. For example, in


exchange for a reduction in gang violence, the government agreed to immediately relocate imprisoned gang leaders to less restrictive prisons and provide them some privileges. Following the successful execution of the first part of the Salvadoran truce, which resulted in near term success for both parties, they began to negotiate broader issues that would take longer for both sides to deliver. ***Our findings suggest that some promised deliverables need to be easily and quickly delivered by both parties early in the process to achieve trust and serve as a first test of gang leaders' ability to deliver.*** Stakeholders have only a brief period of time to provide promised benefits before trust is lost, meaning that tangible benefits need to be delivered in weeks or months, not years.

The Impact of a Gang Truce

El Salvador. We found that El Salvador's gang truce had a definite impact on the homicide rate. The mean number of monthly homicides declined from about 354 prior to the truce to about 218 following the truce, for a net decrease of about 136 homicides per month. Our data show that between March 2012 and June 2014 the truce had saved about 5,501 lives (see exhibit 1).

From a hypothetical stand, it is possible to make the assumption that a number of these deaths averted could have been transformed in disappearances and therefore they were not counted within the official homicide statistics. However, the results from the analysis point out that the number of disappearances was not significantly related with the change in the global behavior of homicides. Additionally, over the period of analysis (January 2010 to June 2014), there was no significant change between the pre-truce and post-truce periods in the number of thefts, extortions, robberies, rapes and auto thefts/robberies.

Exhibit 1: Forecast of homicides without gang truce.



We also found that the gang truce did not result in a homogenous decline in violence across municipalities. About 61 percent of municipalities experienced a decline in homicides, but the decline in violence varied substantially between municipalities. We studied this issue further by examining the impact of the initiative “Free Violence Municipalities” and it was found that the behavior of violence in those municipalities was not significantly linked to the initiative but rather to the general dynamic of the truce process nationwide. Additionally, we parsed out the relative influence of the number of MS13 and 18th Street gang members on the street and in prison from each municipality. Our analyses indicated that following the truce, the number of MS13 and 18th Street gang members on the street in a municipality was not significantly related to a decline in homicide, but the number of imprisoned MS13 and 18th Street gang members from the municipality was. In particular, ***the number of imprisoned MS13 gang members from a municipality was associated with a significant decline in homicides in that municipality following the gang truce and the number of imprisoned 18th Street members from a municipality was associated with a significant increase in homicides in that municipality following the truce.*** These findings lend support to the idea that MS13 is more organized than the typical street gang and that imprisoned MS13 gang members exhibit strong influence over their fellow gang members on the street. Our findings also suggest, however, that the gang truce had a boomerang effect in municipalities with high numbers of imprisoned 18th Street members, implying that 18th Street might not have as much organizational capacity to regulate violence on the streets as MS13. The truce provided incarcerated MS13 and 18th Street gang leaders an opportunity to negotiate with high-ranking officials and influential diplomats, including representatives of the Organization of American States. This may have increased their legitimacy, inside and outside of their gangs. It appears that MS13 was able to exert its span of control over the communities in which they had influence, and they were able to deliver on the terms of the gang truce negotiations. In the case of 18th Street, however, incarcerated gang members may not have had the same organizational capacity for communicating and carrying out directives. In fact, a review of the gang truce indicated that there was a conflict taking place between two factions within 18th Street. Consequently, the organizational structure and culture of 18th Street might be more diffuse than that of MS13,

and its leadership structure might not be as strong because of the internal fractures within the gang. This might further explain why homicides increased in 18th Street communities. The internal fractures within the 18th Street gang may have resulted in intra-gang violent conflict that was largely contained within 18th Street controlled territories.

Jamaica. In Jamaica, at first glance, our impact findings appeared to show that the gang truce might be an effective mechanism for reducing violence. Bivariate analyses showed a significant decline in homicides immediately after the truce was implemented. This explains the work previously published by policymakers, researchers, and news reporters. Upon closer examination of the data, however, comparing change in the target area to other areas in Jamaica, and accounting for temporal trends, we found that the decline in homicide was part of a larger nationwide decline in violence and that the gang truce was not responsible for the decline. The only significant effect that we uncovered was the possibility that homicides were displaced outside the target area for a brief period of time, but then returned to previous levels.

Honduras. Our impact findings from our analysis of data from Honduras tell a very similar story as Jamaica. Initial analysis showed that the number of homicides, on average, declined across municipalities following the gang truce. Specifically, the mean number of homicides declined by 1.2 per 100,000 population, from an average of 6.87 per 100,000 population in each municipality before the truce to an average of 5.66 thereafter. However, after we examined the effect of the truce through time series analysis, and included a variable (month) to control for the temporal trends in the data, the impact of the truce we observed in our bivariate analysis was no longer significant. Our findings, as in Jamaica, suggest that the decline in homicides was less a consequence of the gang truce than of a broader short to medium term trend. And, importantly, in both Jamaica and Honduras, the respective governments failed to deliver on gangs' demands for large-scale social and employment programs.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

Over the last several years, there have been a number of naturally occurring experiments involving gang truces in a variety of nations and regions. Findings from evaluations of gang

truces are mixed. In El Salvador the gang truce could be characterized as an effective short term strategy to reducing homicides. It is worth mentioning that despite homicides rates are above truce levels, they continue slightly below pre-truce levels. In Jamaica and Honduras the gang truce had no short or medium-term impact on overall violence. In Los Angeles and Trinidad y Tobago there was evidence that violence decreased for at least ninety days, but then increased substantially beyond those rates observed prior to the gang truce. Thus, the effectiveness of the truce in El Salvador appears to be isolated and must be evaluated within the context of other truces that have failed to reduce homicide violence. Policy makers must evaluate whether the conditions that allowed short term effectiveness of the gang truce in El Salvador (such as the ability to promise and deliver immediate results) exist in other violent areas before evaluating whether a truce strategy might be appropriate. And they should be heavily cautioned that ***the potential for long term negative consequences might outweigh the potential for short term benefits.***

Indeed, it is important to note that a number of scholars have noted that gang truces are likely to result in a boomerang effect, with gang violence increasing over the long run because of enhanced cohesion within the gang (Klein 1995). Maguire (2013) notes that when government officials negotiate a truce with gangs, they might “inadvertently be acknowledging gangs as legitimate social entities” (p. 11). This in itself might increase cohesion among gangs, which has been found to be associated with increased levels of criminality (Decker et al. 2008; Klein 1971; Maguire 2013). Hence, it is important to consider the fact that gangs are illegal groups in El Salvador and it should be cautious when carrying out dialog or negotiation processes with them. Further research is needed to examine how gang truces might impact group cohesion and, if it does, whether the cohesion created could be effectively directed toward more productive non-violent endeavors. Gang truces convey the well-intentioned image that violence has been addressed and policymakers are doing something about the problem, but unless the truce is implemented in a manner and under conditions where immediately achievable results can be promised, delivered and measured, there remains a significant chance that the truce will fail, or worse yet, backfire. Thus, it is imperative that any type of concession made by

Governments to gangs within a truce framework should be transparent, so that all sectors of society have certainty that every action is being done within the existing rule of law²².

In the case of El Salvador, the truce arises from to the absence of effective public policies and practices for violence control and prevention. The truce was planned as a strategy to reduce gang-related homicides. During the process different organizations got involved, including religious (facilitating and protecting human rights), non-government (managing and facilitating dialog and negotiation processes), international (providing funding for insertion programs), and government (facilitating and providing certain conditions for dialog and negotiation) organizations. Some of the concessions that the Government provided in order to achieve a reduction of homicides were within the law, but others generated confusion and they seemed to be close to the legal or socially acceptable limits. This fact, along with the poor transparency of authorities in the management of the practice with public media and public weakened the process and postponed its continuity.

The present study suggests that gang truces should only be used as a means of last resort, and then only under certain conditions. Given the risks associated with a gang truce, communities with high levels, or at least modest levels, of formal social control should rely on other more promising gang control strategies such as pulling levers (i.e., Boston Ceasefire), community oriented policing, and the Gang Resistance Education and Training (aka GREAT) program. Only when the state has limited or greatly reduced capacity for social control should a truce be considered. Concomitantly, a gang truce should be considered as an alternative only when a community is experiencing a substantial amount of gang violence. Communities that are experiencing minimal to modest amount of gang violence may risk more from the establishment of a gang truce than they have to gain. Additionally, our findings suggest that a gang truce might only be feasible when gangs are sufficiently well organized to be able to regulate their members' behavior and cause their members to behave less violently. In El

²² Pragmatically this issue is complicated. On the one hand, transparency is a foundational element within a democracy and is necessary to ensure proper oversight of the government. On the other hand, it might not be possible to implement a gang truce with too many actors having a voice. Policymakers might consider creating a policy that allows such negotiations take place but requires particular actors (such as a judicial body) to be informed of the process to ensure transparency and adherence to the rule of law.

Salvador there is evidence of the strong organizational structure of gang MS13. Among other factors, the magnitude of its membership, the chain of command from its leaders in prison and the discipline of its leaders in the streets seemed confirmed. On the contrary, the organizational structure of gang Barrio 18 – divided in two factions fighting over the leadership – showed to be a less stable counterpart within the truce.

Finally, dialog and negotiations processes with or between gangs must have the capacity to promise and deliver immediate benefits to the gangs that gang members can see or experience in order to secure their continued participation in the truce, as well as the capacity to monitor and respond to truce violations. Most importantly, any effort aimed at reducing violence is important and should be examined and assessed but it must have a transparent foundation, especially when it affects population rights as a whole.

General recommendations

Gang truces are conjunctural strategies. States who suffer from gang-related violence must establish permanent public policies for crime control and prevention. A government that considers implementing a gang truce should be aware that it cannot become the center strategy of its public policy for citizen safety.

Gang truces should only be used as a means of last resort, and then only under certain conditions. Stakeholders must determine whether a process of dialog or negotiation with gangs is legal, ethical, and feasible.

Stakeholders must anticipate demands that are likely to arise, and their response options. Some demands may be easily met, such as improved prison conditions. Others are much more difficult and amorphous, such as: community development through more integrated violence prevention programs (such as those implemented by SolucionES in El Salvador); local economic development programs; or economic reinsertion of ex-gang members.

Stakeholders should incorporate immediately achievable and demonstrable deliverables. Long-term goals and promises are unlikely to create the trust needed to sustain a gang truce.

Stakeholders must first determine the position in which they are negotiating, the incentives that are possible to deliver, and the boundaries and limits they face. Gangs are mostly likely to trust

representatives from NGOs, community-based organizations, and members of the faith based community as brokers because they are considered more reliably neutral advocates for peace. They need to understand the capacity of the government to deliver promises in a timely manner.

Governments have to make a choice about the visibility and transparency of its participation.

This decision needs to be made in the context of the national and local laws, the public's expectations of transparency, and patterns of practices of the past.

Governments must be strategic in their support for truce initiatives. Some donor funded programs run by the government prohibit gang member participation; and if the government does not receive approval from the donor, it may risk the donor withdrawing its sponsorship of the program.

Governments must ensure an inter-institutional coordination for the management of truces to avoid the responsibility to be of a single government institution. It is necessary to generate or collect reliable and pertinent data that can be used to analyze and assess the process.

It is necessary to implement an effective monitoring system of the truce process, similar to that used in the full report, as it can help parties understand what is working and who is delivering on their promises. More specifically, the monitoring and truce management system should be able to identify truce violations and be prepared to respond through the use of legal and effective practices if stakeholders do not comply.

Finally, it is necessary to develop evaluations of gang truces and monitoring programs, and support violence prevention activities, local economic development activities, and pilot programs to support the reinsertion of ex-gang members into society. Clearly national governments, municipal governments, NGOs, and community-based organizations need increased capacity and resources to discourage the growth of gangs among at-risk youth. It is therefore increasingly important to create economic opportunities for gang members willing to leave the gangs and find other legal employment. Developing and sustaining those opportunities in nations with high incidences of poverty will require significant international funding.

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Introduction

Given the increasingly devastating individual, family, and community effects of gang activity, over the past several decades an increasing body of literature has focused on gangs, gang members, and gang activity. A core theme running throughout this body of literature is that gang members are significantly more likely to be the offenders and victims of violent crime than non-gang members (Battin, Hill, Abbott, Catalano, and Hawkins, 1998; Esbensen, Winfree, He, and Taylor, 2001; Katz et al., 2011; Huff, 1998; Curry et al., 2002; Miller and Brunson, 2000; Miller and Decker, 2001; Pyrooz et al., 2012; Curry et al., 2001), and disproportionately affect neighborhood levels of crime and violence (Block, 2000). These findings have been robust in that they have been repeatedly found regardless of research methodology (i.e., use of official data, self-report data, observational data) (e.g., Curry, 2000; Decker, 1996; Deschenes and Esbensen, 1999; Esbensen et al., 2001; Gordon et al., 2004; Katz, Webb, Schaefer, 2000; Webb, Katz, Decker, 2006) or research setting (i.e., North America, Europe, Asia, South America, Australia) (Klein and Maxson, 2006). As a consequence, it should not be surprising that policymakers, academics, and community leaders have focused much of their attention on developing responses to address community gang problems.

Suppression strategies have been the favored public policy response to gangs since the 1980s (Venkatesh, 1999; Spergel et al., 1995). Suppression strategies typically rely on focusing criminal justice resources on gang members through such practices as targeted and enhanced police patrols, intelligence databases, vertical prosecution, and enhanced sentences for those convicted (Katz and Webb, 2006). Suppression strategies are based on deterrence theory, and are founded on the principal that swift, certain, and severe penalties for those involved in gangs and gang activities will necessarily result in fewer individuals joining gangs and will deter people from engaging in gang crime (Klein, 1995). By the early-to-mid 1990s, as gang problems continued to proliferate, and policymakers sought alternative gang control strategies, gang prevention programming flourished (Papachristos, 2013). Gang prevention programs were aimed at the general youth population, or focused on at-risk youth or neighborhoods. Gang prevention programming was based on the premise that by reducing risk factors, and increasing

protective factors, prevention specialists could inoculate youth from gang membership (Esbensen, 2000). Prevention programming has most frequently come in the form of school-based prevention programming such as the Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) program, where students are exposed to a curriculum designed to reduce both participation in gangs and gang crime, as well as the SolucionES³ program which engages youth and their families through integrated community-based and school based programs.

While a burgeoning body of literature has developed describing the assumptions, issues, and effectiveness of suppression (e.g., Decker, 2003; Decker and Reed, 2002; Katz and Webb, 2006; McCorkle and Miethe, 2002) and prevention strategies (Esbensen and Osgood, 1997), much less attention has been given to examining gang intervention programming. This might largely be the consequence of the absence of such programming over the past 30 to 40 years. By the 1980s policymakers no longer believed that social intervention approaches were an effective strategy to control gangs and gang problems. Although gang intervention strategies took many forms, they were based on the assumption that gang membership is the by-product of a socially deprived community and that the values and norms of gang youth can be influenced and directed toward those of mainstream society. As such, intervention programs often focused on diverting youth from gangs or sought to minimize the consequences of gangs and gang activity. Gang intervention strategies include crisis intervention, dispute resolution, street-level counseling, and youth outreach, (Spergel, 1995). However, many policymakers, community organizations, and academics have argued that such approaches not only did not reduce gang activity, but may have lead to increased group cohesiveness, which in turn may have lead to increased delinquency (Klein, 1971; Spergel, 1995). More recent research has yielded similar results. For example, a number of studies examining replications of Chicago CeaseFire/Cure

³ SolucionES is a Global Development Alliance in which \$20 million is provided by USAID and SolucionES Alliance members will contribute an additional \$22 million dollars during a 66-month period, starting July 2012. SolucionES is being implemented by an Alliance of five leading Salvadoran non-profit organizations who have come together to prevent crime and violence. The Alliance members are: Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE), Fundación Salvadoreña para la Salud y el Desarrollo Humano (FUSAL), Fundación Crisálida (known locally as Glasswing), Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (FUSADES), and Fundación Empresarial para el Desarrollo Educativo (FEPADE). Together, these five organizations have notable expertise in education, health, community development, economic development, research, and youth leadership, they are bringing their combined synergy and strengths to prevent crime and violence in El Salvador. More information on social violence prevention programming is presented in Annex E, including a summary of the violence prevention initiatives being implemented by SolucionES.

Violence, which relies heavily on crisis intervention, dispute resolution, street-level counseling, and youth outreach, have found these strategies to either be ineffective, or worse, increase levels of violence (Fox et al., 2014).

One type of gang intervention, gang truces, however, has received little attention in the literature. This is somewhat surprising given its use and public claims of effectiveness. The purpose of this report is to systematically examine the effectiveness of gang truces. Gang truces have largely been a “black box”; that is, little is known about the frequency of their use, conditions that give rise to them, the role of third parties in brokering gang truces, the transformative effects of truces, and the effectiveness of gang truces. In this report, we review prior research on gang truces, and present evidence on the effectiveness of gang truces that have been implemented in El Salvador, Jamaica, and Honduras.

Theoretical and Policy Rationales for Gang Truces

Much of the concern about gangs over the past twenty years has been their close association with violence. Qualitative and quantitative research has repeatedly found that gangs and gang members are involved in high levels of serious violent offending. Decker (1996) attributes the gang-violence relationship, in part, to the collective and normative structure of gangs, which supports and encourages the use of violence, both preemptively and in retaliation. He further explains that gang membership encourages the use of violence in retaliation against threats and attacks, whether actual or perceived, which results in patterns of inter-gang conflict characterized by escalating violence. Related, Cooney (1998) points out that gangs are not all that different from “warrior societies.” He argues that while gangs are violent, the violence that they engage in is different than that engaged in by non-gang members in that it commonly takes on a feud-like dimension. A perceived slight, violation of turf, or other disrespectful action might invoke a shooting, which, in turn evokes a retaliatory shooting, which, in turn, results in another retaliatory shooting, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of violence.

Early research and theoretical work examining gangs and gang conflict suggested that much violent gang behavior was the function of status management (Thrasher, 1927; Whyte, 1943; Short and Strodtbeck, 1965). Borrowing from the sociology and social psychology literature on

impression management theory, gang scholars hypothesized that youth place significant emphasis on image management—seeking to impress their peers and limiting the potential to embarrass themselves in front of others (Hughes, 2005). These early gang theorists postulated that violence is an instrument used by gangs and gang members to achieve, manage, and protect status. They contend that gang members often make decisions to become involved in a violent conflict based on rational processes that weigh the immediate loss or gain of status within the gang, against the relatively small probability of being formally sanctioned by officials within the criminal justice system (Hughes, 2005). A number of researchers have examined the relationship between status considerations and gang violence and have found the association to be particularly robust regardless of gender (Campbell, 1991; Giordano, 1978), ethnicity (Anderson, 1990; 1998; Vigil, 1988), and location (Jankowski, 1991; Spergel, 1995). Hughes (2005) notes that the centrality of status consciousness by gang youth may account for the existence of the facilitative gang effect that gang scholars have repeatedly observed (i.e., Gangs increase the amount of delinquency individuals are involved in beyond that of a group of delinquent peers (Gordon et al., 2004; Thornberry et al., 2003).

Another micro-social factor associated with gang violence is group cohesiveness. While our understanding of the relationship between gang cohesiveness and violence is underdeveloped some scholars have reported a strong relationship between the two. In particular, Klein and his associates (1971; 1967) and Lucre (1975) have reported that increases in gang cohesiveness lengthens periods of gang membership and increases members participation in gang crime and violence. Cooney points out that there are strong relational ties between gang members that necessarily result in increased cohesiveness among members. For example, gangs are comprised of neighborhood youth who share common cultural and economic experiences and have often known one another for lengthy periods of time. He also points out that gangs are groups that have strong self-proclaimed and formalized identities (e.g., colors, symbols, names, monikers) and have at least some organizational structure. Their sense of group is maintained by their common understanding of their members and friends, and their attachment to their territory (or neighborhood). Decker (1996) notes that the relatively high level of group

cohesiveness exhibited by gangs facilitates both collective behavior and liability (For exception see Hughes, 2013).

Accordingly, both micro-social factors (i.e., status management, gang cohesiveness) serve to augment levels of gang violence and make it difficult for third parties to intervene. Violence within the context of gangs serves as a form of informal social control. Gangs and gang members cannot seek assistance from legitimate institutions of social control to solve conflicts because they would risk losing status (Anderson, 1999). Likewise, the collective nature of the gang not only increases potential offenders and targets of violence but also facilitates, at the group level, the need for retributive justice on the behalf of injured members. Moreover, gang members desire to impress others with their commitment to the group and use violence to demonstrate their commitment to their group and to increase their status within the group. All of this results in an increased cycle of gang conflict and violence.⁴

Over the past several decades residents and policymakers have expected the police to address violent gang conflicts. However, there are several limitations to the police response to gangs. First, as noted above, many of the same factors that are associated with violent gang conflict also limit the effectiveness of the police to have an impact on violent gang conflict. Gang members are not going to contact the police to resolve a conflict because it could result in loss of status and expose them to the police discovering illegal activities that they are involved in (Katz, 2001; Katz and Webb, 2006). Related, citizens in neighborhoods with gang problems are also reluctant to call the police out of fear of gang reprisals (Katz, 1997; Webb and Katz, 2003) or because they have a poor perception of the police themselves (Katz, Choate, and Webb, 2002). Third, the police response to gangs in most communities is a reactive response to a specific incident after it has occurred, rather than a proactive response to intervene in ongoing disputes between gangs (Katz and Webb, 2003; 2006). Most police agencies simply do not have

⁴ There is anecdotal evidence for these hypotheses. Hughes and Short (2005), through field observations and interviews with members of 20 Chicago gangs, examined the micro-social context of violent-related incidents. Specifically, they were interested in the specific social conditions that precipitated violence. Their analysis revealed that gang disputes associated with retaliation escalated into violence significantly more often (i.e., 55% of the time) than disputes associated with normative order violations or an identity attacks, which only resulted in violence roughly 33 percent of time.

the intelligence networks required to intervene in gang conflicts until after they have risen to relatively high levels (Katz, 2003). Fourth, police suppression strategies have been linked to increasing gang cohesiveness and possible increases in gang crime (Klein, 1995).

Some policymakers and community activists have proffered that an alternative to reliance on formal mechanisms of social control, such as the police, is the gang truce (Spergel, 1995). The goal of a gang truce is to reduce or even eliminate violent conflict between those gangs that are warring with one another. As such, compared with other strategies that often seek to reduce general levels of crime; a gang truce has the very specific goal of reducing violence between two or more gangs that are in conflict with one another. Unfortunately, the literature provides little guidance on the theoretical assumptions of why a gang truce should reduce inter-gang violence. Henderson and Leng (1999) hypothesize that at the root of gang truces is the notion that they involve the renegotiation of existing norms within and between gangs. The authors claim that as a violent dispute escalates between gangs, leaders and members are placed in the situation of appearing weak to both members of their own gang, and to members of the rival gang, if they do not respond with the appropriate amount of force or if they were to suggest a peaceful resolution to the dispute. Accordingly, Henderson and Leng argue that as the cycle of violence escalates between two or more gangs behavioral norms shift toward the increased valuation of violence to resolve the conflict because it is the only option readily available to them. A gang truce, on the other hand, which is often mediated by a third-party, is believed to break the cycle of violence by providing the gangs involved in the dispute with a cooling-off period (Spergel, 1995). In the interim period new norms of expected behavior within and between gangs are established. In other words, the cooling-off period is believed to recalibrate norms of behavior that are more consistent with the security interests of the gang and its members (Henderson and Leng, 1999).

For many of the reasons stated above a number of communities have participated in gang truces. Gang truces have been observed in the United States, Central America, and the Caribbean, and gang leaders in other nations are considering its implantation (Fahah, 2012). Unfortunately, little is known about gang truces. We do not know when they come into consideration, how they are implemented, whether they decrease, increase, or even have a

significant impact on violence. In the below section we systematically review the existing body of literature on gang truces. Appendix A describes the methodology we employed to conduct the systematic review.

Prior Research on Gang Truces

Little research to date has examined the effectiveness of gang truces, and of the research that has been conducted, has been restricted to the field of public health. The most celebrated truce to date was Philadelphia's House of UMOJA 1974 gang truce. In preparation of the truce gang leaders in prison were called upon for their support, along with key community leaders from churches, businesses, schools, and the police. When UMOJA called for the gang summit it was reported that 500 gang members and 75% of Philadelphia gangs attended. By the conclusion of the gang summit a 60-day truce was announced, which reportedly resulted in no gang members being killed over the 60-day period. However, no systematic evaluation of the gang truce was conducted (Woodson, 1981).

The first attempt to evaluate a gang truce to our knowledge was conducted by Cotton (1992) who examined the results of a gang truce in South Central Los Angeles between the Crips and Bloods. Data provided by the police department indicated that over the 6-week period when the truce took place, drive-by shootings decreased by 48% compared to the same 6-week period the prior year, decreasing from 162 to 85. Likewise, gang-related homicides dropped by 62%, from 26 to 10.⁵

Ordog et al. (1993; 1995) examined the effects of a gang truce in Los Angeles using emergency room admissions data. Specifically, the authors examined changes in the daily and monthly number of gun shoot wound (GSW) emergency room admissions before, during, and after a gang truce. The catchment area for the emergency room was 100 square miles. The authors noted that while they were able to clearly identify the date the gang truce began, because of the media coverage that it received, there was no specified date that the truce ended, and as a

⁵ The authors did not report whether the drop in gang-related homicides was citywide or in the South Central Los Angeles neighborhood where the gang truce took place.

consequence after 12 weeks the authors regarded it as called off for evaluation purposes because it was no longer being discussed in the media and gun shot wounds began to increase. Student t-tests were used to examine changes before, during, and after the gang truce. Ordog et al. (1995) reported that there were approximately 7 GSW admissions per day the 12-months preceding the truce, compared to 4.5 GSW admissions per day during the gang truce, and 12.6 GSW admissions per day in the 11-months following the gang truce. The authors concluded that their analysis “clearly showed that the institution of a gang truce had reduced the number of GSW victims seen in an ... inner city Level I trauma center” (p. 419).⁶

However, it is important to point out that while the gang truce in Los Angeles did decrease homicides by about 35 percent for the first three months, it then doubled in months four through eleven, compared with the pre-truce period - a pattern that the authors did not discuss. Similar findings were reported in Trinidad and Tobago (Maguire, Katz and Wilson, 2013), where it was determined that homicides declined for a brief period of time (again, for about three months), but then increased substantially over the long term (12 months). These results suggest that gang truces may produce short-term benefits, yet result in long-term adverse consequences.

While the research examining gang truces shows their potential promise, and their potential for greater harm, we believe that the findings should be viewed with caution for two reasons. First, some of the implicit theoretical assumptions that gang truces are built on may not be accurate. Prior research on gangs suggests that they have limited organizational structure (Decker, Katz, and Webb, 2008; Decker, Bynum, Weisel, 1998), and have few formal mechanisms to influence member behavior. For example, most gangs do not have formal leaders, do not require members to pay dues, and members do not make contributions to the gang for the purpose of developing the gangs infrastructure (i.e., guns, housing, etc). A number of academics have pointed out that “sophisticated gang organizations is still largely a product of the self- or organizational-interested musings of gang leaders, certain police officials, academic

⁶ Similar results were presented by Ordog et al 1993 using the same data but analyzing it over a shorter period of time and aggregating the data by month instead of by day.

researchers, media reporters based on very limited hard data” (Spergel, 1995: 79-80). Therefore, even if a truce was successfully negotiated between members of gangs in conflict, much of the academic research suggests that gang leaders do not have enough control over members to enforce a truce. Related, prior research on gangs and gang members suggests that they are primarily comprised of young people with few “diplomatic” skills (Henderson and Leng, 1999). The very same organizational and normative features of gangs that result in gang violence (i.e., often bastions of young minority male street youth) are those same features that most likely limit the likelihood of a gang having the capacity to abide by a gang truce. In sum, implicit in the theoretical assumptions of a gang truce is that gangs have the organizational and cultural capacity to create and maintain (at least for a short while) a truce, which is inconsistent with much prior research on the organizational characteristics of gangs.

The second reason we believe that prior evaluations of gang truces should be viewed with skepticism is that they have relied on relatively weak evaluation designs. For example, prior studies examining gang truces have not incorporated the use of comparison areas or control groups. The causes of reductions in gang violence found in previous evaluations might be many. For example, the Los Angeles riots took place just before the gang truce that Ordog et al. evaluated. Zinzun (1997) reported that gang culture and violence changed briefly but abruptly following the riots because gangs and gang members, in part, redirected their anger and focus toward the police. As such, the decline in GSW admissions may have been the consequence of an overall city-wide decline in gang violence in the wake of the LA riots. Related, prior research has relied on fairly broadly defined outcome measures such as GSW admissions and general levels of drive-by shootings. Such outcome measures lack specificity in terms of attributing gang violence to the specific gangs involved in the gang truce. Evaluation designs used in previous studies have also lacked specificity in terms of the catchment area where violent activity was labeled as gang related. For example, Ordog et al.’s (1993; 1995) outcome measure included all emergency room admissions for GSW. However, the emergency room received patients from a 100 mile square area surrounding the hospital, an area that was most likely much larger than the gangs’ territories involved in the truce.

Additionally, prior research examining gang truces has not examined the processes involved in the creation of the gang truce. No context has been provided in terms of the factors that lead to the gang truces, whether the gangs were pushed or pulled into truces, whether outside parties helped mediate the truces, or whether on-going mediation was required to maintain the truce. In other words, we still do not know the processes related to the formation of a successful gang truce. Instead, prior research and evaluation has treated the gang truce much like a black box, where it is described in very general terms, but its details are not revealed. Likewise, prior evaluations have not examined the effects of a gang truce beyond its impact on gun violence. A number of prior researchers have argued that mediating such activities serves to legitimize gang leaders, increases gang identity for members, and results in greater group cohesion (Haskell and Yablonsky, 1982; Klein, 1995). As such, we do not know if there are any unintended consequences resulting from gang truces due to the methodologies chosen for prior research and evaluation. Finally, prior research on gang truces has not relied on more sophisticated statistical analysis that has the capacity to not only discern overall trends but also cyclic patterns, outliers, and turning points.

THE PRESENT STUDY

The present study seeks to understand the effectiveness of the gang truce when negotiations occur with or between gangs, and with government institutions or civil society organizations. We have briefly reviewed the theoretical and policy rationales for gang truces, and the literature and prior research on this form of gang intervention. Next, we present three case studies, one from El Salvador, another from Jamaica, and another from Honduras. Each offers evidence about their impact on violence and lessons learned that are unique to their particular circumstances. In conclusion, the case studies are considered together and we present their collective policy implications.

Case Study A: Gang Truce— The Salvadorian Experience

Over the past two years, the Salvadoran gang truce, brokered by an array of local policymakers and international development organizations, has attracted national and international attention. Violence in El Salvador has been at an all time high, with a rate of 69.2 homicides per 100,000 population in 2011 (UNODC, 2014), making El Salvador one of the most violent nations in the world (Parkinson 2014). Since 1992, government and non-government actors have been responding to the rising tide of gang violence using traditional suppression strategies such as increased policing, legislative changes, and more severe prison sentences. These traditional mechanisms of formal social control, however, were proving ineffective, if not counter-productive (Perez 2003).

In response to the inadequacy of traditional strategies, stakeholders altered their course in an effort to radically reduce gang violence in the nation. Members of the Funes administration led a group of negotiators comprised of the Catholic Church, a former congressman, and the Organization of the American States (OAS) to help frame the conditions for a possible truce between the MS13 and 18th Street gangs (Umana, de Leon, and Tager 2014). In March 2012, a truce was reached. The goal of the gang truce was to reduce violence, specifically gang-involved homicides. Included in the terms: in exchange for the gangs acting to reduce homicides, certain incarcerated gang members were to be transferred to lower security prisons, to receive sentence reductions and special visitation privileges, and to be permitted more communication with those outside of the prison for the purpose of conducting crisis interventions to mitigate the violence (Salanegra 2012).⁷ The gang leaders also agreed to no longer recruit children into their gangs, reduce violence against women, give up a small number of guns, and continue to participate in negotiations (Seelke 2014, 11-12).

⁷ It is important to note that there were other discussions that took place during the mediations that included, as a local publication noted: "Prohibition Act Gang, send the army to barracks, end the police operations in controlled areas by gangs, repeal of the figure of the witness "criteriado" (with "criteria of opportunity" or "witness under a plea agreement") and a number of improvements in the quality of life of the inmates and its families". Source: <http://www.salanegra.elfaro.net/es/201209/cronicas/9612/>

The present case study seeks to understand the role of negotiations with or between gangs and government institutions or civil society organizations and their impact on violence in El Salvador. The specific objectives of this case study were to: (1) Identify and document the negotiation processes with or between gangs. This includes, but will not be limited to, identifying the actors involved in the negotiations, the goal(s) of the negotiations, and strategies employed to carry out negotiations; (2) Identify the impact of negotiations with and/or between gangs on violence and other forms of criminality; and (3) Present conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of negotiations and their potential for positively or negatively reducing crime in Salvadoran society.

The Salvadorian Gang Truce

While the origins of the Salvadorian gang truce are somewhat unclear, some accounts suggest that in the fall 2011 the Minister of Security (then David Munguia Payes) mentioned the idea of starting a dialogue between the gangs to Raul Mijango (a former congressman). Shortly thereafter Mijango spoke to Monseigneur Fabio Colindres, the military chaplain, about the idea. They started to communicate with gang leaders in January 2012. From the beginning the Minister of Security stated that he would not personally communicate with gang leaders and noted that the official position of the government was not to negotiate with offenders. But he did allude to the fact that the gang truce was part of a new strategy to address the nation's gang problem (Archibold 2012). The Salvadorian gang truce was multi-dimensional, involving a varying number of actors, communication styles, and tactics. In the section below we discuss the parties involved in the truce, the negotiation process, and the strategies used by the gangs and government in furtherance of the truce.

Parties involved in the truce. There were a series of persons, groups, and other entities who directly or indirectly participated in the negotiation process, whether they were negotiators or collaborators. From the beginning negotiations between the MS13 and 18th Street gangs were considered confidential, and were held in strict confidence between the gangs and the negotiators. Beginning in early 2012, the first two mediators to serve were a former congressman (Raúl Mijango) and a priest (Fabio Colindres). These individuals were able to gain

the trust of the gangs and also had open communications with the government and community.

As the process moved forward, however, church leadership changed its initial position and withdrew its support of the truce. This left the priest to participate as a private individual, no longer serving as a representative of the church. The mediators had some early success; however, as the mediators changed, the lines of communication became less clear and less reliable. Still, they played an important role in the process. Finding individuals whom the gangs would trust and who could speak for government and community institutions was challenging. Further, as government ministers and presidents changed, it became less clear whether or not the government was participating in the dialogue between various parties; much of the confusion in negotiations was related to understanding the government's official role in the process.

In the beginning, the negotiating parties included the two mediators and MS13 and 18th Street, the two predominant gangs in El Salvador. MS13 is the largest gang in the country, with about 250 cliques throughout the nation. For the most part, its first- and second-generation leaders were in prison. There are municipalities in which only MS13 operates and, therefore, its members never clashed with 18th Street adversaries. MS13 members are largely involved in extortion, violence, and intimidation of the public. The MS13 leadership has been shown to have greater control of its organization than most; its members have been more disciplined and, despite its size, the gang seems to have sufficient and effective communication mechanisms between cliques and its leadership ("ranfla" or "rueda").

The 18 Street gang is somewhat smaller than MS13. Long before the truce process began, factions existed within 18th street, which had become deeply involved in internal conflicts over leadership structure. Those differences had become more pronounced over time, leading to the establishment of two movements known as the "Sureños" (Southerners) and the "Revolucionarios" (Revolutionaries) that participated in the peace process, but under different

representation. Despite their differences, however, for the negotiation process the two fractions of 18th street established similar demands between themselves and with MS13.⁸

As noted above, the government's involvement in the truce process was never clearly articulated, and it varied with ministerial changes. The Funes Administration, specifically the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJPS), had been engaged in the negotiation process early on. In 2013, however, with the change in MJPS leadership, this also changed. Tensions grew over the role of the government in the truce negotiations. According to the mediators the new Minister of Security wanted to dismantle the process, and for this reason he blocked the mediators' entry to the prisons where they had been meeting with gang leaders. The change in government leadership brought changes in strategy. As with all negotiations, mutual trust was the cornerstone. When the personnel and their agendas changed, so did the trust in the peace process.

Late in 2012, as negotiations began to focus on the relationship between the gangs and the community, other organizations were called upon to help facilitate this interaction. A technical committee was created to oversee progress towards the violence reduction goal; this was announced at the end of August 2012. The committee moved forward with support from the Organization of American States (OAS). It coordinated actions intended to improve the living conditions of incarcerated persons, to reintegrate into society those who had served their time in prison, and to prevent violence and provide assistance to victims of violence. The committee operated as a mechanism for coordinating the negotiation process, with technical support from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)—El Salvador. Interviews with experts indicated that Fundación Humanitaria, with support from several organizations, like Interpeace and others, had also supported the operations of the mediators and served as an important point of reference for the gangs.

In each territory where agreements were made, government representatives from some municipalities were invited to participate in the process as key implementation stakeholders. Between December 2012 and January 2013, the municipalities of Ilopango, Santa Tecla,

⁸ <http://salanegra.elfaro.net/es/201110/cronicas/5645/>

Sonsonate, and Quezaltepeque became among the first to become part of what later became known as the Sacred Municipalities (aka violence free municipalities). By November 2013, several other municipalities had become part of this group: La Libertad, Apopa, San Vicente, Puerto El Triunfo, Nueva Concepción, Ciudad Delgado, and Zacatecoluca.

The gangs and the government offered several incentives to one another. The gangs offered a number of actions to reduce the incidence of crime (i.e., cease of hostilities; zero homicides; stop extortions, robberies, and recruitment of children and youths into gangs; peace at the schools), and the government offered to guide public investments in social policies, prioritizing participating municipalities.

The truce process was the product of a convergence of vested interests from different sectors. Several earlier attempts at negotiations had failed, likely because of a lack of perceived authenticity on the part of the actors. All parties involved in this truce process came to the table with well-defined group interests and concerns. All sides were experiencing fatigue from the long history of violence. Years of fighting, deaths, and violence had led the mostly incarcerated first generation, those who were still living and who continued to serve as gang leaders, to seek new ways of exercising social power and influence in prison and the community.

The negotiation process. In El Salvador, the negotiation process between gangs formally began on March 8, 2012 by a decision of the Government to favor the transfer of gang leaders imprisoned out of the country's only maximum security prison, located in the municipality of Zacatecoluca. That decision was made by the Minister of Justice and Public Security as part of an agreement between a team of mediators, who served as advisors to the Ministry, and gang leaders, primarily from MS13 and 18th Street. The negotiations were referred to as a "truce between gangs" and were characterized by the mediators as "a peace process" or a "cease of hostilities between gangs."

Publicly, the gang truce was known as an agreement between gangs, and not between gangs and the government, because of fear of how those outside the negotiations might interpret the government's actions. From the beginning, therefore, the government never fully

acknowledged its participation in the peace process (through representatives) with the gangs, and that reticence was a major impediment throughout the process. This was largely because of the difficulty in communication between the multiple parties, which was done through mediators, and necessarily resulted in additional logistical complexity throughout the negotiations. Regardless, it is important to recognize that the government played a decisive and central role in the origin, facilitation, and promotion of the peace process.

In terms of processes, interviews with gang leaders indicated that they would communicate their “demands” to the mediators, who in turn would communicate the gang leader’s demands to the government. The same process was used for the government to communicate with the gang leaders. After an agreement was reached the parties would make proclamations that emphasized the agreed upon terms of the negotiations. These often took the form of public statements made through local newspapers. For example, there were more than twenty public statements made by the gangs, where they clearly articulated that their intention was to reduce the harm that their acts of violence were causing themselves and the communities (For a detailed discussion of the public statements see Appendix B). In these public statements the gangs acknowledged the need for their groups to change. Both the mediators and the gangs made clear that the gangs expected the government to respect and respond to their demands, given the good-faith actions that the gangs had already taken.

The government, on the other hand, did not make any formal public statements about their end of the agreements reached through the negotiations. From the outside it appeared that the government did not develop a formal or consistent policy regarding the truce; and instead, assumed that they could achieve a reduction in homicides through the negotiation of increased prison privileges for gang leaders. At the close of the Funes administration, the peace process and negotiations initiated within its framework had reached a plateau. There they remained, waiting for the new government to step in and take action, as President-elect Salvador Sánchez had announced his support for the truce during the electoral process. Sanchez, however, withdrew that support when he assumed the presidency in June 2014. Indeed, under the recently elected Sanchez administration the government changed course, and became less

willing to engage the gangs, believing that the government should not negotiate with criminal organizations.

Indeed, it should be noted that responses resulting in increased gang influence have been a concern over the past several decades—from governmental neglect of the problem in the 1990s, through the period of the "mano dura" and "super mano dura" of the early 1990s to 2000, and to the present gang truce. Many have asserted this claim as truth (i.e., some responses will increase the influence of gangs), especially in public discourse. This study, however, does not directly address this point, which may or may not be valid.⁹

Strategies employed during negotiations between the gangs and the government. Over the course of the negotiations between the gangs, and the gangs and the government, at least two strategies were employed. At the beginning of the negotiations strategies were implemented similar to that of the historic Salvadorian peace accords. Each of the parties, with the support of mediators, reached agreements and achieved a resolution to their conflict. This model, although useful, overlooked an important difference between the current violence in El Salvador and the civil war of the 1980s. In a conflict of civilians with the State, the legitimacy of the “adversaries” arises by the need of the state to recover the rule of law. It is certainly possible to reach peace agreements that resolve conflict between gangs, but in the current case, with regard to the government, there was no legal or policy justification for executing the truce process. On the contrary—government negotiations with a criminal group are relatively rare in modern democratic societies. The lack of a legal or policy framework to work from limited the government’s ability to be transparent in its response to gangs and may have undermined its legitimacy with the public.

The second strategy employed by the parties was based on reciprocation and cooperation between actors. Early on it was determined by both sides that if one of the parties abandoned the peace process, or did not hold up its end of an agreement, the other party would no longer participate in the negotiation process (Axelrod 1986). In retrospect, during the course of the peace process, the gangs implemented agreed-upon terms, and positioned themselves as valid

⁹ We would like to thank one anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue to our attention.

partners with the government; able to negotiate for what is needed by the government in exchange for what the gang needed.¹⁰ For example, in public statements, the gangs insisted that they had made a goodwill gesture when they declared a unilateral truce and stopped their involvement in violence. The government responded by transferring incarcerated gang leaders from a maximum-security prison to ordinary criminal prisons.¹¹ Next, the gangs offered to disarm; the government responded with increased flexibility on control measures at those prisons. This process continued until the demands from both sides grew in a direction that challenged each side's capacity and willingness to follow through.

For instance, mediators, through the government, asked the gangs to end the extortion of businesses and individuals, which are the primary means of subsistence for Salvadorian gangs. The gangs asked that the government reciprocate by eliminating the "witness under a plea agreement" from the criminal procedural law; which is one of the main weapon laws used for sentencing gang members for complex crimes such as extortion. Each of these requests were more than the parties could carry out. Exhibit 1 outlines the different "offers" and "demands" made by each party. The offers and demands are divided into those that were believed to be relatively simple and were "offered" by the party on its own volition, and those that were believed to be more complex and were demanded by the other party.

Exhibit 1: Simple demands and concessions made by gangs and the government.

Gang concessions	Government concessions
Reduce the homicides by more than 50%.	Transfer the leaders to prisons with lesser security.
Hand over 500 firearms to the authorities.	Allow visits of the children of the gang members.
Reduce violent actions at schools.	Allow night intimate visits.
Stop killings at the prisons.	Allow entry of fast foods.
Do not murder custodians, police, soldiers, or their family members.	Facilitate the entry into the prison of gang members let out of prison.
Give opportunities to some gang members to withdraw.	Suspend the searches by the armed forces on persons at the prisons.

¹⁰ Source: <http://www.salanegra.elfaro.net/es/201209/cronicas/9612/>

¹¹ This was useful to facilitate the coordination and the communication between the gang members in prisons and in the streets.

Make it more flexible for new social plans by government to be established in the communities controlled by gangs.	Improve the conditions and health assistance at the prisons (e.g., place tv's to improve mental health of inmates).
Do not burn buses; do not kill bus drivers or collecting agents in buses.	Allow the Red Cross and journalists to enter into the prisons

The second agenda, presented in Exhibit 2, shows the more complex demands that were not offered by one side or the other, but rather were demands placed on the other party. These demands were such that they required a higher level of authority to negotiate in order to implement the demanded action. These demands were considered critical for the peace process to continue, and the delayed responses on both sides stalled the progress of the truce and led to the parties questioning the legitimacy of the other side; all these demands have yet to be attained. The mediators recognized at the end of 2012 that some of the slow progress was related to the difficulty of making the transition from offers that could be executed relatively simply, to the more complex demands made by each party. One of the gang leaders summarized the issue: “We are not looking for television sets while all of our people continue living like shit; we are not going to try to do everything that is in our power to decrease as much violence as possible for one television set. There are things we are very clear about: this [points to a television set in the room] is a right that the law grants”.

Exhibit 2: Complex demands and concessions made by gangs and the government.

Demands by Gangs	Demands by Government
Eliminate the figure of witness under a plea agreement from the Criminal Law	Stop homicides and extortions indefinitely
Create international commission to investigate the human rights violation cases of the gang members and their family members on the part of the State (PNC and FA)	Share the information regarding the whereabouts of the brunt of extortion money whether in country or abroad
Institutionalize external and professional surveillance regarding the behavior of the PNC as regards investigations and gang member arrests.	Progressive dismantling nation-wide of the clique structures and turfs
Army should stay in its barracks and definitely suspend their participation in public security tasks.	Permanently suspend the orders to murder State security and justice agents and their family members (police, soldiers, judges, prosecutors)

Clearing of judges, prosecutors and police involved in corruption cases against youths in conflict with the law	Permanently suspend the murders, extortions and harm caused to public transportation resources and their workers
Maintained a sustained improvement on the conditions of the prisons	Permanently suspend the recruitment of children and youths and hostilities to educational centers
Guarantee working opportunities for the gang members and their family members through specific programs at the municipalities.	Share the information about providers of drugs and illegal arms

Television sets were one of the concessions made by the government from the simple list. The gang leader recognized that their intentions in the negotiations extended beyond improving prison conditions; however, the government did not have support nor established mechanisms for carrying out tasks derived from the more demanding list. Further, as the government transitioned to new presidential leadership, many of the more simple concessions had already been made and the new government would have to address more complex demands if negotiations were to continue.

The Salvadorian gang truce is remarkable for several reasons. First, a number of policymakers and researchers have claimed that the truce saved a large number of lives, and was perhaps the most successful gang truce in the Western Hemisphere. Second, the Salvadorian gang truce is somewhat unique in that it might have lasted substantially longer than any other successfully negotiated gang truce. Understanding the temporal impact of the truce is important to understanding its future potential. Third, the Salvadorian gang truce is important because a number of other countries have sought to replicate it. For example, following the perceived (and perhaps real) success of the Salvadorian gang truce, the nations of Honduras, Belize, and Guatemala instituted, or tried to institute, a similar type of truce. Understanding the impact of the Salvadorian gang truce will further help us understand the potential impact of such a process on violence in these other nations.

Methods

We examined the impact of the gang truce by merging four separate data sets. First, data from the 2007 El Salvador Population and Housing Census provided municipal level measures of

percent unemployed, percent male aged 10-29, percent female headed households, ethnic composition, in-migration, income, percent urban, percent households rented, and percent who had a high school education. These data were obtained directly from El Salvador's Ministry of Economy. Second, municipal level crime data (i.e., homicide, extortion, rape, theft, robbery, and auto theft/robbery) were provided by the National Civil Police (PNC) by month and year for the period between January 1, 2010 and June 30, 2014. Disappearance data was also provided by the police, aggregated by year and municipality. Third, police gang intelligence data was provided by the National Civil Police (PNC). Specifically, we received the number of police recorded MS 13 and 18th Street gang members by municipality in 2011, the latest year for which these data were made available. Last, we acquired 2011 prison gang intelligence data on the number of imprisoned MS 13 and 18th Street members by municipality from the Salvadorian National Bureau of Prisons. All four data sources were linked together using a unique municipality identification number and month. Collectively, they provide an opportunity to examine the impact of the gang truce in El Salvador and understand several competing explanations for any changes that might have occurred.

The geographic unit of analysis for the present study is the municipality. According to the 2007 El Salvador Population and Housing Census there were 14 departments divided into 262 municipalities (the equivalent of a county in the USA) in El Salvador. Of the 262 municipalities ten (3.8%) of the municipalities were eliminated from the analysis because of missing data.

Measures

Dependent variables. The dependent variable in the present study is the monthly number of homicides in each El Salvadoran municipality, expressed as the number of homicides in municipality i at time t : y_{it} . Homicide data were collected from January 1, 2010 through June 30, 2014 for a total of 54 months. This includes data for a period of 26 months prior to the gang truce and 28 months following the implementation of the gang truce. As shown in Exhibit 3, there were a total of 14,148 homicides over the study period, with each municipality averaging 3.71 homicides per month.

Exhibit 3: Descriptive statistics.

	n	mean	s.d.
Urban Opportunity Factor	252	1.11	.95
% male 10-29 years old	252	19.60	1.71
% female-headed household	252	34.33	4.99
% unemployed	252	11.77	6.86
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity	252	.17	.13
# of prisoners MS13	252	15.79	39.60
# of prisoners 18 th Street	252	12.68	40.96
# of prisoners MS13_spatial weight	252	15.79	39.60
# of prisoners 18th Street _spatial weight	252	12.68	40.96
# MS13 on the street	252	41.46	106.46
# 18 th Street on the street	252	25.13	86.22
Violence free municipality	252	.04	.20
Truce	14148	3.71	7.83
Monthly homicide rate per 100,0000	14148	.51	.49

Independent variables. Several independent variables were included in our model. Our measure for the intervention is a dummy variable in which the value of 0 is used to represent the pre-intervention months and 1 represents the post-intervention months, T_t . We also included a dummy variable for each community that participated in the violence-free municipality initiative (sanctuary municipalities) to address issues of external validity (e.g., multiple treatment inference), S_t . In other words, municipalities that participated in the violence-free initiative might have experienced or participated in something that either enhanced or detracted from the impact of the larger gang truce. The initiative, called by some the second phase of the gang truce, took place about 8 to 9 months after the original gang truce was negotiated in March 2012. In participating sanctuary municipalities, gang members agreed to stop violence and crime in exchange for a reduction in police operations and night raids.¹² The municipalities that participated in the initiative included Santa Tecla, Quezaltepeque, La Libertad, Ilopango, Ciudad Delgado, Apopa, Sonsonate, San Vicente, Zacateatecoluca, Puerto El Triunfo, and Nueva Concepción.

¹² See <http://www.cispes.org/blog/violence-free-cities-inaugurated-as-second-phase-of-gang-truce/>.

We included several independent variables related to the presence of gangs, by gang, for each municipality. Specifically, we included count variables on the number of MS13 and 18th Street gang members who were on the streets and in prison, by municipality. As noted before, the gang truce was made between a relatively small number of imprisoned gang leaders from both MS13 and both fractions of 18th Street who agreed to stop street-level gang violence on the condition that they would be transferred to lower security prisons and granted special privileges.

We wanted to understand the impact of the truce in the context of gang presence. Municipalities with high numbers of MS13 and 18th Street members, whether they were in prison or on the streets, should have experienced a greater reduction in homicides because of a greater span of control over these communities. Accordingly, municipalities with low numbers of MS13 and 18th Street members should have experienced a lesser reduction in homicides because of a limited span of control over these communities. As Exhibit 3 (above) shows, on average, municipalities had about sixteen MS13 and thirteen 18th Street members in prison, and forty-one MS13 and twenty-five 18th Street members on the street. We examined whether gang members in El Salvador were randomly distributed and found that there was spatial clustering in the number of MS13 and 18th Street members who were in prison. In order to control for the clustering, we included the spatial lag (weight) of the MS13 and 18th Street members in prison.

Control variables. A series of control variables known through prior research to be related to violence in communities were added, using the census data. We began with municipal-level measures of percent unemployed, percent male aged 10-29, percent female-headed households, ethnic composition, in-migration, income, percent urban, percent households rented, and percent with a high school education. Initial analysis found that five community variables were highly correlated and loaded on the same factor. As seen in Exhibit 4, these included the percentage of persons who had moved there from another municipality (in-migration), average income in the municipality, percent of the population living in an urban area, percent of houses that are rented, and percent of residents with at least a high school education. We labeled this factor *Urban Opportunity*.

Exhibit 4: Factor loadings for urban opportunity.

Variables	Factor loadings
In Migration: Percent of population moved in from another municipality	0.638
Income: Average monthly income per household (colones)	0.886
Urban: Percent of population that is urban	0.845
Rented: Percent of households rented	0.761
Education: Percent of residents who have at least a high school education	0.742
Percent of variance	60.71%
Eigenvalue	3.41

* Extraction method: Principal Axis Factoring

We also calculated a measure of ethnic-heterogeneity from relevant census data. Ethnic heterogeneity, which varies from 0 to 1, was calculated by taking one minus the squared proportions of the population in each ethnic group (White, Mestizo, other). As with the percentages of male population that is 10-29 years old, female-headed households and unemployed persons, ethnic heterogeneity has consistently been associated with violence in general (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003) and with gang violence in particular (Katz, Maguire, and Roncek 2002; Rosenfeld, Bray, and Egley 1999).

Analytic Strategy

National-level analysis. Our analysis began with a simple t-test of the mean number of homicides at the national level before and after the truce, providing the most basic omnibus test of an effect. We then presented our time series model to estimate the effect net of seasonality and temporal trends. This analysis included a set of simple ARMA (autoregressive and moving average) models with two lag periods and one period of a moving average. Initial analysis of the number of homicides by month indicated that partial temporal autocorrelations existed for two lags. The first model used only data prior to the truce. This model included a linear time trend variable and dichotomous variables for each month (except January). We used this model to forecast the expected number of homicides for the truce period. This series of analyses was for illustrative purposes only, as the number of data points used in the forecast

was too small to provide meaningful confidence intervals. The second ARMA model employed all data from January 2010 through June 2014 and included a dichotomous indicator for the truce period. The effect of this variable was the average change in the number of homicides, net of seasonality (months) and temporal trends.

Municipality multilevel models. The analysis at the municipal level presented four challenges to a typical regression model. First, since our outcome has a highly skewed distribution with varying levels of exposure (population), we employed a generalized linear model to capture the correct distribution. In this case, we employed a negative binomial distribution rather than a Poisson model due to the over-dispersion in our outcome created by analyzing monthly municipal data—that is, there were several months and municipalities where no or very few homicides occurred.

The second challenge was our need to measure the between-municipality variation of pre-truce homicide rates and the program effect. A fixed-effects model would have been inappropriate because it would not have allowed us to estimate these variance components. Thus, we employed a multilevel, random effects, generalized linear model.

The third challenge was temporal autocorrelation. Analysis at the national level indicated partial autocorrelations in the first and second lags. Although a generalized model does not allow for auto-correlated residuals, we addressed this by entering in the model two lags of the homicide rate.

The fourth and final challenge to this estimation was spatial autocorrelation. An examination of the Moran's I and autocorrelation coefficients (exhibit not shown) indicated a low level of autocorrelation for each month, but many months were still statistically significant. Thus, we estimated spatial lags of the homicide rate and entered them into the model.

Accordingly, we analyzed the data using random effects negative binomial models, regressing the rate of homicide on various months on predictors with both temporal and spatial lags. For clarity, we present the model using HLM (Bryk et al. 1996) notation. At the first level (time), we estimated the log number of homicides using a negative binomial distribution with predictors

that included the truce period, $TRUCE_t$, calendar month, m_t , linear month trend, $TIME_t$, a one period lag of the homicide rate, $HR_{t-1,i}$, a two-period lag of the homicide rate, $HR_{t-2,i}$, a spatial lag of the homicide rate, HR_{i^*} , and an over-dispersion parameter, v_{ti} , which has a Gamma distribution of $\text{Gamma}\left(\frac{1}{a}, a\right)$. Thus, the final level 1 model is:

$$m_{ti} = \exp \left[\begin{array}{l} b_{0i} + b_{1i} TRUCE_t + \sum_{m=1}^{11} /_m m_t + /_{12} TIME_t \\ + /_{13} HR_{t-1,i} + /_{14} HR_{t-2,i} + /_{15} HR_{i^*} + v_{ti} \end{array} \right]$$

$$\exp[v_{ti}] \sim \text{Gamma}\left(\frac{1}{a}, a\right)$$

At the municipality level (level 2), the intercept, b_{0i} , is a function of the presence of the Violence Free Municipality program, $SAFE_i$, the log number of MS prisoners, PMS_i , the log number of 18th Street prisoners, $P18th_i$, the log of the spatial lag number of MS prisoners, PMS_{i^*} , the log of the spatial lag of the number of 18th Street prisoners, $P18th_{i^*}$, the log of the number of MS members, MMS_i , the log of the number of 18th Street prisoners, $M18th_i$, the control variables detailed above, C_i , and the random effect, u_{0i} . Thus, the level 2 model for the intercept is:

$$b_{0i} = g_{00} + g_{01} SAFE_i + g_{02} \ln(PMS_i + 1) + g_{03} \ln(P18th_i + 1) + g_{04} \ln(PMS_{i^*} + 1) \\ + g_{05} \ln(P18th_{i^*} + 1) + g_{06} \ln(MMS_i + 1) + g_{07} \ln(M18th_i + 1) + \underset{C}{\overset{\circ}{\alpha}} \rho_C C_i + u_{0i}$$

Also at the municipality level (level 2), the effect of truce, b_{1i} , is a function of SAFE, $SAFE_i$, the log number of MS prisoners, PMS_i , the log number of 18th Street prisoners, $P18th_i$, the log of the spatial lag number of MS prisoners, PMS_{i^*} , the log of the spatial lag of the number of 18th Street prisoners, $P18th_{i^*}$, the log of the number of MS members, MMS_i , the log of the number of 18th Street prisoners, $M18th_i$, and the random effect, u_{1i} . Thus, the level 2 model for the truce effect is:

$$b_{1i} = g_{10} + g_{11}SAFE_i + g_{12} \ln(PMS_i + 1) + g_{13} \ln(P18th_i + 1) + g_{14} \ln(PMS_{i*} + 1) \\ + g_{15} \ln(P18th_{i*} + 1) + g_{16} \ln(MMS_i + 1) + g_{17} \ln(M18th_i + 1) + u_{1i}$$

The key parameters of our analysis are in this expression. The truce effect, b_{1i} , is dependent on the log number of MS prisoners $\ln(PMS_i + 1)$, among other characteristics. Thus, the percent reduction in homicides can be calculated from this model using the following formula:

$$\left(1 - \exp\left[g_{10} + \ln\left((PMS_i + 1)^{g_{12}}\right)\right]\right) \times 100$$

which we plot below (see *Quantitative Findings*, below).

To answer questions about the variation in the effects of the gang negotiations, we predicted best linear unbiased predictions (BLUP) of the Truce random effect u_{1i} , which estimates the between-community variance of the immediate effect of the truce. Since we assumed that the interventions were not evenly spread throughout communities in this study, the mixed model is appropriate to address this issue. We conducted this analysis for homicide using a Stata generalized linear mixed model using full maximum likelihood and an identity covariance matrix of random effects.

Findings

Exhibits 5 and 6 present our findings related to the number of police recorded homicides in El Salvador from January 2010 through June 2014. The trends in the data and the results of the t-test show that in the 26 months prior to the gang truce there were, on average, about 354 homicides per month compared with about 218 homicides per month in the 28 months following the gang truce. Exhibit 7 shows that the gang truce resulted in 5,501 fewer homicides than otherwise would have occurred.

Exhibit 5: Change in homicides from pre-truce to post-truce.

	Obs	Mean	S.D.	95% confidence interval	
Pre-truce period	26	354.42	42.00	337.45	371.38
Post-truce period*	28	218.35	63.61	193.69	243.02
Change		-136.06		106.38	165.74

*=p < .05



Exhibit 6: Number of homicides in El Salvador by month with ARIMA Model Fit.

Exhibit 7: Forecast of homicides without gang truce.



Next, as seen in Exhibit 8, we examined the spatial distribution of the change in the homicide rate after the implementation of the gang truce. The analysis showed that of the 252 analyzed municipalities, 243 (93%) experienced a decrease in homicides; however, within these municipalities there were wide variations in the degree of the decline. For example, of the 243 municipalities that experienced a decrease, the decrease in the homicide rate varied from about 59 percent of these municipalities experiencing a 1-74 percent decrease to about 9 percent of municipalities experiencing a 75 percent or higher decrease. Additionally, a modest number ($n=19$; 7%) of municipalities experienced an increase in their homicide rate.

Exhibit 8: Percent reduction in homicide rate by number of municipalities.




Exhibit 9 presents six negative binomial models for the monthly number of homicides. The first model examines the impact of the gang truce and implementation of the Violence Free Municipality program, and our interaction variable that measures the additive effect of both the gang truce and the Violence Free Municipalities program, on the number of homicides. We found that although the gang truce was associated with a significant decline in homicides, the Violence Free Municipality program was related to a significant increase in homicides.¹³ However, countrywide, the additive effect of implementing the gang truce and the Violence Free Municipalities program was associated with a significant decline in homicides.

¹³ To be clear, our bivariate analyses showed that the violence free municipalities program was related to a significant decline in homicides. For example, on the one hand, those municipalities that did not participate in the violence free municipalities program experienced a decline in their homicide rate from 4.06 homicides per 100,000 population in the pre-truce period to 3.21 homicides per 100,000 in the post-truce period. On the other hand, , those municipalities that participated in the violence free municipalities program experienced a substantially greater decline in their homicide rate from 7.52 homicides per 100,000 population in the pre-truce period to 3.92 homicides per 100,000 in the post-truce period. However, after other variables are controlled for in our negative binomial models, we found that the violence free municipalities program did not have a positive impact on homicides over and above the gang truce itself.

Exhibit 9: Negative Binomial models for monthly number of homicides.

	Model 1 Coefficient (se)	Model 2 Coefficient (se)	Model 3 Coefficient (se)	Model 4 Coefficient (se)	Model 5 Coefficient (se)	Model 6 Coefficient (se)
Homicide - 1 month lag	0.010 *** (0.002)	0.010 *** (0.002)	0.010 *** (0.002)	0.010 *** (0.002)	0.010 *** (0.002)	0.010 *** (0.002)
Homicide - 2 month lag	0.012 *** (0.002)	0.013 *** (0.002)	0.013 *** (0.002)	0.013 *** (0.002)	0.013 *** (0.002)	0.013 *** (0.002)
Homicide rate spatial lag	0.003 *** (0.001)	0.003 *** (0.001)	0.003 *** (0.001)	0.003 *** (0.001)	0.003 *** (0.001)	0.003 *** (0.001)
Gang truce implemented	-0.483 *** (0.066)	-0.541 *** (0.065)	-0.553 *** (0.064)	0.057 * (0.278)	-0.544 *** (0.064)	0.564 * (0.279)
Violence free municipality	0.497 ** (0.181)	0.183 (0.167)	-0.003 (0.152)	-0.076 (0.143)	-0.037 (0.153)	-0.094 (0.145)
Ln(# +1) of MS13 prisoners			0.066 ** (0.023)	0.176 *** (0.028)	0.062 ** (0.043)	0.171 *** (0.028)
Ln(# +1) of 18th St prisoners			0.067 ** (0.021)	0.044 (0.024)	0.064 ** (0.021)	-0.043 (0.024)
MS13 prisoner spatial lag			-0.004 (0.045)	0.054 (0.055)	-0.003 (0.046)	0.049 (0.056)
18th St prisoner spatial lag			0.022 (0.027)	0.014 (0.032)	0.019 (0.027)	0.012 (0.032)
Gang truce * violence free municipality	-0.346 * (0.158)	-0.294 (0.156)	-0.309 (0.158)	-0.161 (0.146)	-0.304 (0.158)	-0.059 (0.145)
Gang truce * Ln(# +1) of MS13 prisoners				-0.185 ***		-0.185 ***

8.month	0.047 (0.051)	0.047 (0.051)	0.047 (0.051)	0.046 (0.051)	0.047 (0.051)	0.046 (0.051)
9.month	-0.055 (0.053)	-0.055 (0.053)	-0.057 (0.053)	-0.058 (0.053)	-0.057 (0.053)	-0.058 (0.053)
10.month	0.040 (0.052)	0.040 (0.052)	0.041 (0.052)	0.041 (0.052)	0.041 (0.052)	0.041 (0.052)
11.month	0.022 (0.052)	0.022 (0.052)	0.022 (0.052)	0.022 (0.052)	0.022 (0.052)	0.022 (0.052)
12.month	-0.040 (0.053)	-0.040 (0.053)	-0.042 (0.053)	-0.043 (0.053)	-0.042 (0.053)	-0.043 (0.053)
Urban opportunity factor		0.209 *** (0.040)			0.042 (0.040)	0.033 (0.039)
% male 10-29		0.039 (0.021)			0.007 (0.019)	0.009 (0.019)
% female-headed household		-0.006 (0.007)			0.002 (0.007)	0.000 (0.006)
% unemployed		0.001 (0.006)			-0.002 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity		0.058 (0.263)			-0.039 (0.235)	-0.087 (0.230)
Intercept	- *** 10.571 (0.064)	- *** 10.544 (0.060)	-11.054 *** (0.194)	-11.618 *** (0.241)	-11.015 *** (0.212)	- *** 11.558 (0.257)
Ln(Alpha)	-2.287 *** (0.113)	-2.289 *** (0.113)	-2.293 *** (0.114)	-2.294 *** (0.114)	-2.293 *** (0.114)	-2.294 *** (0.114)
Truce random effect	0.202 (0.039)	0.193 (0.038)	0.202 (0.040)	0.144 (0.031)	0.201 (0.040)	0.143 (0.031)
Intercept random effect	0.315 (0.047)	0.226 (0.035)	0.192 (0.032)	0.164 (0.027)	0.183 (0.031)	0.158 (0.027)
Cov(Truce and Intercept)	-0.162 *** (0.037)	-0.099 ** (0.031)	-0.122 *** (0.031)	-0.086 *** (0.025)	-0.114 *** (0.031)	-0.090 ** (0.026)

The second model includes those variables from Model 1, but also includes variables that controlled for community-level structural factors. In this model, the gang truce remains significantly associated with a decline in homicides, but the Violence Free Municipality program and our interaction variable were no longer related to a reduction in homicide. Although the percentage of residents in a municipality who are male aged 10 to 29, female-headed households, percent unemployed, and ethnic heterogeneity were unrelated to changes in homicide, the urban opportunity factor was significantly associated with homicide.

Models 3 and 4 included our measures of intervention as well as our measures of the number of MS13 and 18th Street on-the-street and incarcerated gang members at the municipality level. The analysis showed that while the number of MS13 on the street was unrelated to homicides, the number of 18th Street gang members was associated with an increase in homicide. These analyses also indicated that the number of incarcerated MS13 and 18th Street gang members from a municipality was associated with a significant increase in homicides. We further examined whether this relationship was associated with the gang truce by including two interaction variables, as presented in Model 4. One measured the interaction between the number of incarcerated MS13 gang members and the gang truce, and a second measured the interaction between the number of incarcerated 18th Street gang members and the gang truce. The results showed that following the gang truce, the number of incarcerated MS13 gang members was related to a significant decrease in homicides and the number of incarcerated 18th Street gang members was related to a significant increase in homicides.


Models 5 and 6 in Exhibit 9 present the same two models (3 and 4) as above, but include the community-level structural variables. Model 5 once again shows that the number of MS13 members on the street remains unrelated to the change in homicides and the 18th Street members on the street was associated with a significant increase in homicide. However, Model 6 shows that, following the gang truce, the number of incarcerated MS13 gang members remained significantly associated with a decline in homicides, while the number of incarcerated 18th Street gang members remained significantly associated with an increase in homicides.

Community-level structural factors were found once again to be unrelated to changes in homicide rates.

Exhibit 10 below further illustrates the relationship between reductions in homicides by municipality and the municipal-level presence of MS13 and 18th Street gang members in prison. The figure shows that in municipalities with no incarcerated MS13 and 18th Street gang members, no change in homicides occurred following the gang truce. However, when a municipality had ten MS13 gang members imprisoned, on average, that municipality experienced a 55 percent reduction in homicides. When a municipality had fifty MS13 gang members imprisoned, those municipalities, on average, experienced a 71 percent reduction in homicide following the truce. Conversely, our analysis showed that the number of 18th Street gang members in prison (from a municipality) had a significant and positive impact (that is, the number increased) on homicides following the truce. For example, if a municipality had ten 18th Street gang members imprisoned, on average, that municipality experienced a 31 percent increase in homicides.¹⁴

¹⁴ We examined whether there was an interaction effect between gang members on the street following the gangs truce. Analysis for both MS13 and 18th street and their interaction with the gang truce showed no effect.

Exhibit 10: Impact of the gang truce by number of gang members in prison at the municipal level.



The Gang Truce and Crime Displacement

We examined two types of displacement: crime type displacement and method displacement. Some policymakers have suggested that although homicides may have declined as a consequence of the gang truce, other forms of criminality, or categories of reported crime, may have subsequently increased. Crime type displacement occurs when offenders who focus on one type of crime switch to another form of crime in order to avoid detection or to benefit in some other way (Eck 1993). In El Salvador's case, some critics of the gang truce have suggested that as homicides decreased, other forms of criminality, such as extortion, might have increased substantially due to gang members' increased freedom to conduct activities inside and outside of prison (Dudley 2013; Parkinson 2014). Method displacement occurs when offenders change their tactics or methods of conducting crimes as a consequence of an intervention (Eck 1993). Following the gang truce in El Salvador, some analysts argued that gang

members might have begun to hide the bodies of homicide victims to avoid detection and to “protect the integrity of the country’s gang truce” (Bargent 2013, 1).

As noted above, we rely on police data that measured monthly numbers of thefts, extortions, robberies, rapes and auto thefts/robberies, by municipality. We also received data on the annual number of disappearances in each municipality, by year. Exhibit 11 presents the descriptive statistics for these variables. It shows that the rates of theft and robbery did not change significantly between the pre- and post-truce periods, and the rate of extortions significantly declined. The t-tests showed that the rates of rape, disappearance, and theft/robbery from/of an auto increased significantly.

Exhibit 11: Descriptive statistics for measures of displacement.

	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Theft rate				
Pre-truce	12.38	0.49	11.42	13.35
Post-truce	12.13	0.49	11.15	13.10
Extortions rate*				
Pre-truce	3.53	0.23	3.08	3.98
Post-truce	2.71	0.21	2.29	3.14
Robbery rate				
Pre-truce	5.44	0.25	4.95	5.93
Post-truce	5.53	0.25	5.04	6.02
Rape rate*				
Pre-truce	0.49	0.03	0.43	0.56
Post-truce	0.64	0.05	0.54	0.73
Theft/Robbery Vehicle rate*				
Pre-truce	1.32	0.22	0.90	1.75
Post-truce	1.65	0.23	1.20	2.10
Disappearance rate*				
Pre-truce	8.05	0.68	6.70	9.40
Post-truce	10.07	0.64	8.82	11.32

*p < .05

We further examined the data (excepting disappearance data) similarly to the analyses above, in which we used random effects negative binomial models and regressed the number of

crimes (i.e., theft, extortion, robbery, rape and auto theft/robbery) on various months on predictors with both temporal and spatial lags. Our independent and control variables remained the same as those used in Model 6 (displayed above, in Exhibit 9). We found that over the study period, there was no significant change between the pre-truce and post-truce periods in the number of thefts, extortions, robberies, rapes and auto thefts/robberies (tables not shown).

As noted above, we also received data on the number of disappearances by municipality and year, but because the data were provided by year, there were not enough data points to examine them temporally. Therefore, we added this covariate (number of disappearances, by municipality and year) to Model 6 in Exhibit 9. The results of the analysis indicated that the number of disappearances was not significantly related to change in homicides, the gang truce remained associated with a significant reduction in homicides, and our interaction variables (number of incarcerated MS13 & 18th Street members * truce) remained significantly associated with homicides.

Conclusions

The present study sought to examine the impact of the gang truce on violence and other forms of criminality. We examined homicide data, by municipality, prior to and after the gang truce. Our outcome variables were obtained from the PNC, along with several independent and control variables obtained from the Ministry of Economy and the National Bureau of Prisons. We analyzed this data using a number of time series and random effects negative binomial models, where we regressed the rate of homicide on various months on predictors with both temporal and spatial lags, and controlled for other contextual factors. This type of analysis allowed us to correct for the number of homicides in one month being related to the number of homicides in the previous month (i.e., temporal autocorrelation). Additionally, it allowed for the fact that some communities participated in supplemental interventions (i.e., violence free municipalities initiative), which might have impacted the outcome in the same way in a given month. These techniques allowed us to isolate the effects of the gang truce as best possible. We also used data from the PNC that measured, by municipality, the number of thefts,

extortions, robberies, rapes, auto thefts/robberies, and disappearances to examine the possibility of the truce's impact on crime displacement and diffusion of benefits.'

Our findings suggest that El Salvador's gang truce had a significant and dramatic impact on the homicide rate. The mean number of monthly homicides declined from about 354 prior to the truce to about 218 following the truce, for a net decrease of about 136 homicides per month. Our forecast showed that between March 2012 and June 2014 the truce had saved about 5,501 lives. As will be discussed further below, the analysis suggests that key stakeholders have the capacity to renegotiate existing norms of violence and that at least some gangs have the capacity to exert substantial informal social control over their members that can result in reduced violence.

The gang truce also lasted substantially longer than previously evaluated truces. Ordog et al. (1995), for example, reported that the much publicized gang truce in Los Angeles decreased homicides by about 35 percent for the first three months, but then doubled in months four through eleven, compared with the pre-truce period. Similar findings were reported in Trinidad and Tobago (Maguire, Katz and Wilson, 2013), where it was determined that homicides declined for a brief period of time (again, for about three months), but then increased substantially over the long term (12 months). These results suggested that gang truces may produce short-term benefits, yet result in long-term adverse consequences.

The findings of the present case study suggests that some gang truces might last longer than previously believed. While the number of homicides began to slowly increase about 12 months following the truce in El Salvador, the results clearly showed that almost two years following the truce homicides still remained below those experienced prior to the truce.

We found, however, that the gang truce did not result in a homogenous decline in violence across municipalities. About 61 percent of municipalities experienced a decline in homicides, but the decline in violence varied substantially between municipalities. For example, while about 16 percent of these municipalities experienced a 25 percent reduction in homicides, a number of others (37%) experienced a 75 percent or greater reduction. Furthermore, it is important to note that about 20 percent of municipalities experienced a modest *increase* in

homicides. This suggests that the impact of a gang truce might be variable and could be dependent on contextual factors. We examined the possible influence of these factors by assessing the impact of social structural factors and the presence of gangs on the municipal-level impact of the gang truce. While we found that social structural factors were unrelated to a decline in homicides, municipal-level gang presence was associated with the decline in violence as a consequence of the gang truce.

We examined this issue further by parsing out the relative influence of the number of MS13 and 18th Street gang members on the street and in prison from each municipality. As noted above, we hypothesized that municipalities where gang member presence was high, regardless of their presence on the street or in prison, would experience a greater reduction in homicides because of their increased influence in these areas. We found, however, that the relationship was not as direct as we would have suspected. In particular, our analyses indicated that following the truce the number of MS13 and 18th Street gang members on the street in a municipality was not significantly related to a decline in homicide, but the number of imprisoned MS13 and 18th Street gang members was associated with a significant change in homicides following the gang truce.

Of special note was our finding of the differential impact of the truce, based on gang. Although we found that the number of imprisoned MS13 gang members was associated with a significant decline in homicides following the gang truce, we also found that the number of imprisoned 18th Street members was associated with a significant increase in homicides following the truce. These divergent findings might be associated with each gang's organizational structure and its capacity to regulate member behavior.

Much prior research suggests that imprisoned MS13 gang members have substantial influence over violence in Salvadoran communities,¹⁵ perhaps even more so than formal mechanisms of

¹⁵ Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (Iudop) La situación de la seguridad y la justicia 2009-2014: entre expectativas de cambio, mano dura militar y treguas pandilleras / Aguilar, Jeannette (Coord.)... [et al.]. --1ª. ed. --San Salvador, El Salv.: Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (Iudop), 2014.- 260, p.: gráficos, tablas, cuadros y figuras; 28 cm. (Talleres gráficos, UCA). http://www.uca.edu.sv/iudop/wp-content/uploads/libro_la_situaci%C3%B3n_de_la_seguridad.pdf

social control such as the police and courts.¹⁶ Law enforcement officials for years have claimed that MS13 is one of the most organizationally sophisticated street gangs in the Western Hemisphere.¹⁷ The gang has been widely characterized as having a highly vertical organizational structure and strong control over criminal enterprises in gang-controlled neighborhoods, and as being decidedly capable of enforcing rules through discipline. MS13 leadership resides in the nation's prison system. The Ranfla (gang leadership) is comprised of thirteen MS13 gang members (PNC 2011) who direct, coordinate and authorize street crime and other gang activity from prison. Our findings lend support to the idea that MS13 is more organized than the typical street gang and that imprisoned MS13 gang members exhibit strong influence over their fellow gang members on the street.

Our findings also suggest, however, that the gang truce had a boomerang effect in municipalities with high numbers of imprisoned 18th Street members, implying that 18th Street might not have as much organizational capacity to regulate violence on the streets as MS13. The truce provided incarcerated MS13 and 18th Street gang leaders an opportunity to negotiate with high-ranking officials and influential diplomats. This may have increased their legitimacy, inside and outside of their gangs. It appears that MS13 was able to exert its span of control over the communities in which they had influence, and they were able to deliver on the terms of the gang truce negotiations. In the case of 18th Street, however, incarcerated gang members may not have had the same organizational capacity for communicating and carrying out directives. In fact, a review of the gang truce indicated that there was a conflict taking place between two fractions within 18th Street. Consequently, the organizational structure and culture of 18th Street might be more diffuse than that of MS13, and its leadership structure might not be as strong because of the internal fractures within the gang. This might further explain why homicides increased in 18th Street communities. The internal fractures within the 18th Street gang may have resulted in intra-gang violent conflict that was largely contained

¹⁶ Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (Iudop) La situación de la seguridad y la justicia 2009-2014: entre expectativas de cambio, mano dura militar y treguas pandilleras / Aguilar, Jeannette (Coord.)... [et al.]. --1^a. ed. --San Salvador, El Salv.: Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (Iudop), 2014.- 260, p.: gráficos, tablas, cuadros y figuras; 28 cm. (Talleres gráficos, UCA). http://www.uca.edu.sv/iudop/wp-content/uploads/libro_la_situaci%C3%B3n_de_la_seguridad.pdf

¹⁷ <http://www.laprensagrafica.com/eua-declara-a-ms-grupo-delictivo-transnacional>

within 18th Street controlled territories. Further analysis is needed to examine this specific issue.

While not the primary focus of this case study, we controlled for any impact that the Violence Free Municipalities program might have had on homicide in 11 municipalities during the truce. As noted above, the Violence Free Municipalities program served as the second phase of the gang truce (Cawley 2013). The program was first proposed by the two mediators, and designed by the Technical Committee on Violence and Crime Reduction, which included representatives from OAS, MJPS, the mediators, and the Humanitarian Foundation (CISPES 2013). The program involved the mayors of each municipality collaborating with gang leaders to design prevention and intervention resources for gang members and at-risk youth. The Minister of Justice and Security, David Mungia Payes, announced that his ministry would facilitate \$74 million in funding from the OAS, UN, and other donors to implement the programming. In exchange gang leaders agreed to end violence and other criminality in the Violence Free Municipalities (CISPES 2013). The negotiators also agreed to further discuss both gangs' demand to repeal of the 2010 law that increased the capacity of the police and prosecutors to crack down on gangs (Ayala 2014).

Our findings suggested, however, that the Violence Free Municipalities program was unrelated to change in homicides in these communities. While much additional research is needed to understand why the program was not effective, it might have been because the gangs had already agreed to a truce, and had already reduced violence to the extent that they could. Conversely, the demands made by the gangs as part of the Violence Free Municipalities program might have been more than could be delivered. The time and resources required to implement the programming, and the political capital that was required to repeal legislation might have been much more than could be delivered. Future research is needed to examine the processes and impact of the Violence Free Municipalities program.

Regardless, the base rate of violence in El Salvador was reset for a period of time, suggesting that perhaps the gang truce substantially altered existing norms of violence. Klein (1995) argued that cycles of gang violence (that is, perceived or real changes in gang activity) are

typically the consequence of seasonality, epochal variation (peaks and valleys in violence), and illusion (it appears as if there is a real change in violence, but there is not). In El Salvador, we appear to have observed a self-directed cycle of normative change wherein incarcerated MS13 gang leaders directed a reduction in violence by actuating their organizational span of control through the gang truce. Some of the most powerful and influential gang members in El Salvador used their political, social and economic capital to promote the truce and articulate new norms of violence. They were able to do this by leveraging their informal social control over the streets through actual or perceived threats of violence against those who violated the terms of the truce.

However, following a change in government leadership, and the government subsequently distancing itself from the gang truce, the conditions and capacity of MS13 leaders to intervene in local violence might have deteriorated, and violence began to increase substantially. This is in part because the third parties in the negotiation were no longer able to communicate with government officials about furtherance of the truce. Specifically, the mediators were no longer able to negotiate on the behalf of the government; and were no longer permitted entrance to the prisons where they could negotiate with gang leaders.

Case Study B: Gang Truce— The Jamaican Experience

In the latest report by the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, Jamaica ranked as the sixth most violent nation in the world, with a homicide rate of about 52.1 per 100,000 residents (UNDOC 2011). Policymakers and researchers have attributed the nation's high level of violence to such factors as drug trafficking (Klein, Day, and Harriott 2004), access to illegal firearms (Lemard and Hemenway 2006), and historical processes that include a legacy of conflict between the nation's two primary political parties (Sives 2002; Figueroa and Sives 2003; Moser and Shrader 1999) all of which have facilitated the entrenchment of the more powerful gangs in communities of the urban poor. Likewise, high levels of income inequality and chronic youth unemployment (Francis and Lyare 2006), problematic urbanization (Stone 1975), social marginalization and an emergent subculture of violence (Harriott 2008) have contributed to the nation's violence problem. Whatever the causes, violence has had a considerable impact on Jamaica's social and economic development; it has decreased investor confidence (Schwab and Porter 2008), tourism (Harriott 2007) and access to public services. It has also increased the costs related to the health care system (Mansinghand and Ramphal 1993), the criminal justice system (Caribbean Human Development Report 2012) and the education system (Moser and Holland 1997).

Jamaica's homicide problem is closely associated with its gang problem. The Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) has estimated that some 272 gangs are active in the nation, most in or near the capital city of Kingston (Harriott 2014). Gang types and their respective historical patterns of conflict matter in Jamaica, as these variations may determine their predisposition or amenability to lasting, rather than opportunistic, truces. Jamaican gangs include territorially organized crime groups, conflict gangs, defense crews who regard themselves as defenders of their communities (Levy 2009), and other less cohesive, more transient territorial groups. Some of the latter are predatory; others bond around the taken identities that generate conflicts of other similar groups.¹⁸

¹⁸ These are generally rooted in subcultural issues such as the demand to be treated with respect, or with the indiscretions and self-centered aggressiveness of individual members that may be associated, for example, with sexual competition for the favors of women.

Estimates of the gang-related homicide rate in Jamaica vary, perhaps because the crime is not clearly defined as far as attributing a death to a gang. Regardless, researchers agree that the proportion of homicides that are gang related has increased substantially. For example, Harriott (2003) reported a fourfold increase in the rate of gang-related homicides between 1983 and 1997. Likewise, Hill (2013), using official police data, found an eightfold increase from 2001 to 2009; reportedly, in 2001 only about 6.4 percent ($n=73$) of the nation's 887 homicides were gang related compared with 52.3 percent ($n=879$) of its 1,682 homicides in 2009.

To address the problem, Jamaica has initiated traditional law enforcement strategies such as establishing a specialized gang unit (Sinclair 2004), initiating curfews (Sinclair and Tuner 2005), declaring states of emergency (Jamaican Observer 2010), and implementing community-oriented policing (Kolpack 2006). It also attempted legislative reforms to curb election fraud and electoral-related violence that involved local gangs (Levy 2009). None of these strategies stemmed the tide of gang violence. In 2002, the Minister of National Security established the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) (Henry 2011) to augment governmental and non-governmental organizational capacity to settle gang disputes in the community through intervention-based programming such as ceasefires and gang truces.

The current study examines the peace initiative instituted by the PMI in Greater August Town. Our objective was to understand the negotiation processes undertaken with and between gangs and other stakeholders. Among other things, we were interested in identifying the actors involved in the negotiations, the goal(s) of the negotiations, and the strategies employed to carry them out. Most importantly, however, we wanted to determine whether the gang truce resulted in the desired outcome: a reduction in the number of homicides in the Greater August Town area.

The Greater August Town (Jamaica) Peace Initiative

Greater August Town is located on the northeastern outskirts of the city of Kingston. The low-income area has high rates of youth unemployment and a history of gang-related violence (Charles 2004; Levy 2009). Over the last decade, the Greater August Town community has sought improved living conditions and revitalization (Levy 2009, 95). The area's inherent

resilience has been augmented by nearby intellectual and cultural engines such as the University of West Indies, the University of Technology, and University Hospital (Charles 2004, 38).

Greater August Town is comprised of the communities of August Town proper (which is fractured into several locales with gang-given names such as “Vietnam,” and “Open Land,” and city government-approved names such as Hermitage, Goldsmith Villa (Angola) and Bedward Gardens. These socially defined community divisions and subdivisions are markers for the territorial boundaries of street gangs and therefore, in some instances, are lines of potential conflict. Some of those boundaries demarcate areas of Greater August Town that are predominantly supportive of one or another political party, but the boundaries do not always hold political significance; politics is but one element in the conflict geography of the area. Like many communities of the urban poor, the Greater August Town area is easily mobilized politically – a reality that is understood and at times exploited by street gangs who politicize gang “wars” in their efforts to build alliances and to neutralize the police. In fact, the basic principle of community mobilization in Jamaica is political patronage and clientelism. Access to resources (e.g., jobs, housing, education) for the poorest residents is often determined by the local political party. Thus, according to Charles (2004, 36):

. . . supporters attach themselves to the political parties to get first preference in the distribution of scarce resources and over time because they are unemployable they become dependent on their political party for their economic survival. These supporters will kill anyone who threatens the support base of their political party because they perceive it as a threat to their daily survival.

As a consequence, some political supporters invest heavily in the electoral contests and provoke conflicts that affirm their loyalty to their party in order to secure material benefits from it. Political competition is one conflict fault line in what otherwise is a politically heterogeneous community. Specifically, political support in Greater August Town is divided between the Peoples’ National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP). The PNP receives strong support from residents in August Town proper, the upper region of Goldsmith Villa, and

Bedward Gardens, while the JLP is supported by those living in Hermitage and the lower region of Goldsmith Villa (Charles 2004). The division between the political parties in the area, as in much of Jamaica, was believed to be at the root of much of the community's violence, particularly between 1979 and 1993. Some gangs aligned with the PNP and others with the JLP; this often resulted in political boundaries overlapping with gang turf (Charles 2004).

Pre-truce Violence

Nationally, the history of gang violence in the Greater August Town area first appeared as political violence, closely associated with the electoral cycle. As in many other urban communities, the problem intensified — deeply affecting community life in the period just prior to the national elections of 1980 — then continued cyclically until 1993. Gangs have since harnessed this legacy in order to establish and maintain community support based on common political affiliations. They have used that support to nullify the efforts of law enforcement to suppress their illicit activities (Harriott 2008).

The conflict profile of these gangs, and of the communities in which they are nested, has changed over the decades. From the beginning of their involvement in political violence and territorial control, a form of gerrymandering existed that manipulated the voting population, forcing certain individuals out of a particular constituency and preventing those who remained in the community from voting for the opposing party. This was linked both to the electoral cycle and to the types of inter-gang conflicts that typically were associated with street gangs (Figuerou, Harriott, and Satchell). More recently, however, much of the crime and violence perpetrated by gangs has resulted from internal conflicts (e.g., status management, disputes over women/girls or money, individual members' activities that could attract police pressure). Internal conflict at times has led to gang fragmentation and new alliances that pull more parties into the conflict, escalating the homicide rate and increasing the sense of insecurity among the general population (Levy, 2012).

The most significant of these internal conflicts resulted from the killing of former Jungle 12 leader Neil Wright by members of his own gang. Jungle 12 was the most influential gang in Greater August Town. Before his murder, in order to increase the gang's access to illicit

opportunities in Kingston, Wright had been attempting to extend Jungle 12's influence with a system of alliances with other gangs and recruitment in Kingston (Harriott, 2014). In short, his ambition was to transform Jungle 12 from a neighborhood street gang, operating on the outskirts of Kingston, into to a dominant organized crime network that could reach into the heart of the city. In pursuit of this goal, Wright recruited members from outside August Town, elevating them in the gang hierarchy above the locals. This led to status-related conflicts and resistance to Wright's leadership within the gang. His murder precipitated a split of Jungle 12 into three factions; two of them fled to other neighborhoods within August Town (Angola and Vietnam), resulting in the formation of new alliances and a new conflict geography that replaced the former political geography of conflict. Wright's killing and the subsequent demise of Jungle 12 as the dominant gang in Greater August Town altered the balance of power and escalated inter-gang violence (Harriott, 2014). The post-2005 phase of conflict was characterized by power symmetry, conflict intensification, and the spread of conflict throughout the entire geographic area of Greater August Town.

Although their origins are unclear, retaliatory killings and other violent incidents progressively intensified between 2005 and 2008. The violence was episodic; retaliations were most often motivated by suspicions related to personal and geographic connections between warring gangs. As the violence escalated, new alliances were formed to enhance power and dominance, which in turn increased the number of gangs and gang members involved in the violence (Harriott 2014). This eventually attracted national attention and triggered community mobilization for a gang truce.

The Truce-making Process

The Greater August Town gang truce was preceded by frequent, intense violence and public outrage. As noted above, the violence had escalated in November 2005 when Jungle 12 leader Neil Wright was killed. The defection of a Jungle 12 member to Goldsmith Villa (Angola) caused infighting within the gang and conflict between it and Goldsmith Villa. Just a few months later, Wright's brother Steve and two others were injured during a turf battle (Martin-Wilkens 2006).

Thereafter, violence began to occur at regular intervals until January 2007, when the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) hosted a peace march in the community. Two PNP politicians urged the community to unite. A PMI leader declared that the peace march was being held to “demonstrate to the public that Jungle 12 members are back together and that they want peace” (Thompson 2007, 1).

Although hopeful, some residents remained skeptical about the peace march, perceiving the action to be politically motivated. In the absence of trustworthy information, inter-group conflicts tended to be interpreted through a politically partisan lens; this created obstacles to isolating the gangs, building a consensus for peace, and unifying community mobilization. The politically based narratives weakened the community’s leverage for peace as well as the exposure of the gangs to police action. As one resident said, “The election is coming up and they want[ed] the people to vote for the PNP is one of the main reasons why they have to walk today” (Thompson 2007, 1). Those who shared such views stayed away from the peace march. Although that widely held myth was not factual, it did serve to demoralize and demobilize one part of the community. A local UWI faculty member was articulate in his assessment of the politics behind the march:

August Town violence is not violence of organized crime, which is based on drug trafficking, extortion, or some other criminal enterprise, [but] rather the violence in August Town is essentially “tribal” — the People’s National Party tribe versus the Jamaica Labour Party tribe [which has been complicated . . . by a splintering within the PNP tribe] (2007, 1).

Indeed, it was not the violence of organized crime, but neither was it political violence. The individual quoted above neglected to mention that the conflict was between those pro-PNP splinter groups who were largely comprised of members of Jungle 12. Moreover, their “pro-PNP-ness” was unrelated to the conflict; there was no factional infighting within the local PNP organization at that time.

Nevertheless, following the peace march the gang violence diminished. Then in November 2007, a turf war erupted between two gangs from the Greater August Town neighborhoods of

Vietnam and River. This time, as the police stated, the gang violence was less about politics and more about dominance and turf. Police were dispatched to perform directed patrols, but whenever they were not present, the shootings continued (Mcleod 2007). In April 2008, the community witnessed local gangs engaging in a five-hour-long street battle that left two killed and three others wounded. It ended only after the police deployed armored trucks. The next month, another round of gang violence resulted in five others being killed, including a one-year-old child. This resulted in the three members associated with the gang who committed the homicides being killed in retaliation (Virtue 2008). The local community mobilized against the violence, increasingly cooperating with the police, providing more information about the gangs. Subsequently, gang members observed a decline in their influence within the community.

During the early period, characterized by low-intensity conflict, the less influential gangs at times used manipulation of the police as a tactic for suppressing the more influential gangs. This was largely done through strategic release of information. Prior to 2005, when Jungle 12 was dominant, its members' illicit activities were constantly reported to police by members of other gangs as a means of compelling a compromise or settlement of conflicts. In practice, this was done by "trading cases." Once a crime had been investigated by the police and suspects had been charged, an opportunity was created for the gangs and other parties to the conflict to settle the matter by agreeing to drop their cases (typically by ceasing cooperation with police investigators). This type of "self-help" served to end some of the retaliations, but it rested upon the manipulation of the police (Harriott 2014).

Later, in an attempt to quell escalating inter-gang violence the police established buffer zones between the warring gangs. This action resulted in unintended consequences. For example, when the police declared a buffer zone between August Town and Hermitage, Hermitage took advantage of the opportunity to attack Angola. Some Angola residents accused the police of turning a blind eye and creating an opportunity for Hermitage to attack their community. Although little reliable information exists about why the police made the deployment the way that they did, it is more likely that the police inadequately assessed the situation (i.e., mis-assessed the pattern of alliances and the likely targets of attack) (Harriott 2014). In the areas affected by this kind of increasing violence, community members became angered and lost

confidence in the police. The error resulted in some parties to the conflict receiving increased support from their communities and in greater gang-community cohesion (Harriott, 2014). After a brief period, the police identified this problem and began to disengage by no longer providing a buffer between gang controlled areas, which in turn allowed still more conflict to occur between the gangs.

As the violence escalated beyond their control, police finally responded by applying their own forms of pressure. For example, units under the direction of the JCF High Command would make periodic raids in the community during which they would at times seize weapons and make mass arrests (Sinclair 2005). However, there were also moments when the local police were very responsive, improved their relations with the community, and consequently gained greater access to relevant information. Two such moments occurred just prior to and again immediately after the truce, moments during which there was greater freedom of movement and open collaboration between the community and the police (Harriott 2014).¹⁹

The Establishment of the Greater August Town Gang Truce

The Greater August Town gang truce was led by the Jamaican Peace Management Initiative (PMI). The PMI is a government-funded initiative created for the purpose of working with gang members to reduce violence. Due to community mistrust of the police, in 2002 the organization was established as an alternative organizational mechanism for responding to gang violence. The PMI sought to bridge government and civil society efforts to mediate disputes between gangs, as well as to provide outreach to gang members (Bakrania 2013). While efforts to institute a gang truce in Greater August Town were led by the PMI, a number of other stakeholders helped to facilitate the truce; these included faculty at the University of the West Indies (UWI) and representatives from the police, the faith-based community, and the August Town Sports and Community Development Foundation (Jackson 2008; Levy 2009; also see Appendix C). The gangs involved in the truce included those from August Town, Hermitage,

¹⁹ The quality of police-community relations largely depended on the style of the local station commander, however, regardless of the external environment.

Goldsmith Villa, Bedward Gardens, and African Gardens. Because of its formality as well as its perceived effectiveness, the truce, signed on June 24, 2008, was regarded by many as the first of its kind in Jamaica (Levy 2009).

Truce negotiations began early in June 2008 and lasted for about three weeks. The gangs sought to leverage their violence-making capabilities and demanded payment for peace. They asked the third-party negotiators for money, “work,” and start-up funds for proposed micro-businesses (Wilson 2014). Those demands were rejected by the negotiators on the grounds that the third-party institutions would not buy a peace that was intended to save the lives of those who were making the demands. Moreover, if peace was to be purchased, then gang conflict could be used continuously to extract money and other benefits from negotiators. The third-party actors made some demands of their own. In some quarters of the community and society, the surrender of guns was viewed as a litmus test of the sincerity of the gangs. Consistent with this, the negotiators suggested that the parties to the conflict symbolically hand over one gun each; that suggestion was immediately rejected by the gang leaders. These kinds of demands from the various parties ceased after a time, as they all agreed that the truce was to stand on its own merits (Harriott 2014).

As the truce began to be committed to paper, a number of stakeholders expressed concern that their greatest risk in participating could be the potential for Jungle 12 factions to use the peace agreement, as they had in the past, as a tactic to persuade their enemies to let their guard down. Others, however, recognized that Jungle 12 had now been weakened and that a formal, public peace agreement would be beneficial to the gang, and therefore this time would be different (Harriott 2014).

The gangs held fast to their claim that their weapons were needed for their own protection because the police were ineffective in responding to violence in their communities (Jamaican Gleaner 2014). It became a precondition of the truce that the gangs would not be required to turn in their guns and other weapons (Jackson 2008). The truce agreement did specify, however, that “all persons are allowed to move freely across all boundaries regardless of reputation or affiliation. No gun salute or any other shooting is to take place in the community

for a period of at least five years” (2008; also see Appendix C). The truce agreement and its conditions were prescribed in a document that was finally signed by all of the major stakeholders, including the gangs (see Appendix C).

Throughout the negotiations, each of the gang leaders had attempted numerous times to use the truce as an opportunity to bargain for money, jobs, and business support grants. Such demands consistently were rejected by the third-party actors. Nonetheless, both prior to and after the truce, some efforts were made to create better opportunities for young people residing in the community. UWI, for example, provided a homework supervision program to encourage students to further their education, and it developed a community-building initiative to help improve schools and enhance sports programming (Levy 2009). Such programs were conducted as part of UWI’s Township Project in August Town, which invested significant resources in developing the residents’ job-related capabilities and collective self-efficacy.

The Greater August Town gang truce was noteworthy for two reasons. First, the gang truce received substantial press attention. The media were invited to witness the “signing” of the truce by the gang leaders in the presence of a JCF Deputy Commissioner of Police, a PMI board member, and the UWI Principal and two professors of its faculty. Second, the truce was widely credited with decreasing violence in Greater August Town, and it served as an exemplar to other communities seeking to replicate its success (Virtue 2008). A number of reports, manuscripts and newspaper articles proclaimed the truce to be a success. Bakrania (2013, 10), for example, reported that “PMI has been credited with stopping gang wars in August Town” Levy (2009, 94) remarked that the “most interesting outcome of PMI efforts to date was the Peace Agreement reached in August Town in late 2008.” Likewise, a government report noted that “the peace treaty was a pivotal achievement in August Town that has significant potential for wider application. Crime levels dropped markedly in August Town after the signing of the peace agreement in June 2008” (McLean and Blake-Lobban 2009, 78). To this day, August Town celebrates the signing of the truce with an annual celebration with food and music (Cunningham 2011).

Methods

Our evaluation relied on a pre-test/post-test quasi-experimental group design. Our methodology examines the Greater August Town community which is comprised of three contiguous towns where the gang truce took place (the target area) and the balance of Jamaica which is comprised of 178 communities (comparison areas). As seen in Exhibit 12, the average number of residents living in each of the three communities in the target area was not significantly different than that for the rest of Jamaica; about 7,776 residents lived in each of the Greater August Town communities compared with 6,468 in the other communities. Likewise, communities of Greater August Town were about as densely populated as other communities (2,960 per square kilometer versus 2,647 per square kilometer), and the age range of residents was similar, as well. However, Greater August Town (a) had a significantly higher proportion of its residents living in poverty (19.6% vs. 15.8%), (b) consumed fewer resources than other communities, and (c) reported significantly more homicides than other communities prior to the truce (see Exhibit 12).

Exhibit 12: Descriptive characteristics of Greater August Town and balance of Jamaica (2007-2011).

	Comparison Area	Greater August Town	All areas
Population (mean)	6,468	7,776.33	6,489.94
(s.d.)	7,204.82	3,537.31	7,156.21
Population density (mean)	2,647.19	2,960.33	2,652.38
(s.d.)	2,710.23	2,855.01	2,704.65
Percent in poverty*	15.77	19.57	15.83
(s.d.)	10.36	1.06	10.29
Consumption*	157,378.90	110,693.9	156,604.8
(s.d.)	107,130.20	2,053.36	106,402.1
% residents under 15 yrs old	23.69	24.94	23.71
(s.d.)	4.87	1.15	4.84
% residents 15-65 yrs old	68.40	69.01	68.41
(s.d.)	4.23	.29	4.19
Murder per month (mean)	6.74	8.57	6.77
s.d.	19.28	14.09	19.20
Total murders	10,068	180	10,248
n	178	3	181

* $p \leq .05$

Measures

Two distinct data sets were merged to measure the impact of the Greater August Town truce. First, data from the 2011 decennial census provided community-level measures of the social and economic characteristics of the 181 communities in Jamaica. Described in detail below, the community-level data used in the study included population, population density, gender, age, poverty and consumption.²⁰ These data were obtained directly from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica.

Second, police homicide data from the years 2007 through 2011 were used to construct the study's community-level measure of homicide. The homicide data were aggregated by month

²⁰ Consumption is an alternative measure of poverty in Jamaica, which measures the consumption of food and non-food items.

and appended to the community-level data. The final (merged) data set included 10,248 homicides over the 60-month study period. These data were obtained from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF).


The dependent variable examined in the study was constructed from official police homicide data. Once again, the homicide data represented the number of officially recognized homicides in Greater August Town and each of the remaining communities in Jamaica. We examined change by comparing the homicide data 18 months prior to the truce with the homicide data 42 months following the truce. More specifically, we examined whether there was a change in the number of homicides in the 30 days following the truce (month 1), as well as whether the truce had an impact every three months thereafter (i.e., months 2-5, 6-8, 9-11, 12-14, 15-42), and whether any changes in homicide coincided with changes in homicide in the balance of observation areas. The frequency distribution of our dependent variable is presented in Exhibit 13. It shows that prior to the truce, the target area, on average, experienced significantly more homicides (14.95) than did the comparison areas (9.20).

Exhibit 13: Distribution of homicides in the target and comparison areas.

		Comparison Area	Target Area	Total
Pre-truce period*	Mean	9.20	14.95	9.32
	SD	24.69	19.66	24.61
	N	2,414.00	51.00	2,465.00
Month 1 of truce	Mean	7.41	2.86	7.33
	SD	17.85	4.96	17.72
	N	178.00	3.00	181.00
Months 2 thru 5 of truce	Mean	6.47	9.05	6.52
	SD	18.21	12.49	18.12
	N	712.00	12.00	724.00
Months 6 thru 8 of truce	Mean	5.77	12.36	5.88
	SD	16.90	10.74	16.83
	N	534.00	9.00	543.00
Months 9 through 11 of truce	Mean	7.18	3.33	7.11
	SD	20.34	7.33	20.19
	N	534.00	9.00	543.00
Months 12 through 14 of the truce	Mean	6.87	0.95	6.78
	SD	15.19	2.86	15.09
	N	534.00	9.00	543.00
Months 15 thru 42 of the truce	Mean	5.64	5.89	5.64
	SD	16.83	10.42	16.74
	N	5,162.00	87.00	5,249.00
Total	Mean	6.74	8.57	6.77
	SD	19.28	14.09	19.20
	N	10,068.00	180.00	10,248.00

An illustration of the trends in homicide prior to and following the gang truce are shown in Exhibit 14. It shows that 30 days following the truce, homicides fell in the target and comparison areas, then increased and decreased several times, with a general downward slope in violence over time.

Exhibit 14: Monthly number of homicides pre-post truce in the target and comparison areas.



We also used a number of measures to control for community-level structure from the 2011 decennial census. These community-level data included the community's population, population density (per square kilometer), and community level of consumption. Additionally, the census data included measures of the percentage of the population that was female, under 15 years old, 15 and 65 years old, and 65 years old and older, as well as a measure of the percentage of the population living in poverty. Principal components analysis was used to reduce some of these data into a summary measure.

Exhibit 15 shows the results of the component loadings. One component was extracted that we designated as socio-economic status (SES), which exhibited high loadings for percent living in poverty, percent under 15 years old, percent 15 to 65 years old, and consumption. Excluded from the principal components analysis were population and population density. Population was used as our exposure variable and population density was logged to address skewness in these data.

Exhibit 15: Factor loadings from principal components factor analysis.

	Loading
Poverty	.78
Consumption	-.76
% under 15 years old	.92
% between 15 and 65 years old	-.80

Analytic Strategy

In order to test whether the truce had an impact on homicides in the target area and/or whether displacement had occurred in the balance of the study area, several analytic techniques were employed. Most of the methods employed the use of the homicide rate as the dependent variable. We explored the data in this way to provide the maximum statistical power to detect an effect. As a check on these methods, we also employed a generalized model to compensate for the non-normality of our outcomes.

First, focusing only in the target area, we performed a simple t-test comparing the homicide rates before and after the truce (the unit of analysis was a month); however, this technique had limitations, the most severe of which was that even if the test were significant, it would be difficult to determine whether the difference was due to the gang truce or a natural change over time in the outcome. Second, to address this limitation, time series models were employed whereby the homicide rate for the target area was modeled as a function of time, with truce period indicators included to measure the effect of the truce net of the temporal trends. These models were estimated with ARIMA techniques with a one-month lag auto-correlated error. Third, we examined the homicide rate for each town using a panel time series model. In this model, the temporal trend for each town was examined with indicators for target areas and truce periods included. The main effects for the truce periods measured the effect of the truce in the target areas, and the moderators of the truce period in the comparison areas measured displacement effects. Finally, because the dependent variable coded is not normally distributed across months, we used a negative binomial time series model to estimate the number of homicides, with the population covariate serving as an exposure variable.

Findings

The first set of results examines only the target area. The first test was a simple t-test comparing the mean homicide rates before and after the truce periods. The result was a mean difference in the homicide rate of -8.90 per 100,000, with a significant t-statistic of 3.70. While

this result is statistically significant, we caution that it may or may not reflect an impact of the truce. To further examine the truce effect in the target area, we performed ARIMA regressions. The first model did not include an effect of the temporal trend. In this model, we again find that by month 15, the murder rate decreased by about -8.9 per 100,000 (Exhibit 16).

Exhibit 16: Results of basic ARIMA model.

ARIMA regression

Sample: 564 - 623

Number of obs = 60

Wald chi2(7) = 14.72

Log likelihood = -208.9969

Prob > chi2 = 0.0397

murders_rate	OPG		z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.				
murders_rate						
t_1	-11.11771	44.63623	-0.25	0.803	-98.60311	76.36769
t_2	-5.166363	4.498142	-1.15	0.251	-13.98256	3.649834
t_6	-2.861008	6.335492	-0.45	0.652	-15.27835	9.556328
t_9	-13.2475	9.189969	-1.44	0.149	-31.25951	4.764507
t_12	-15.07749	18.20406	-0.83	0.408	-50.7568	20.60181
t_15	-8.888017	2.969383	-2.99	0.003	-14.7079	-3.068134
_cons	15.38436	1.904285	8.08	0.000	11.65203	19.11669
ARMA						
ar						
L1.	.1720758	.1242218	1.39	0.166	-.0713944	.415546
/sigma	7.877339	.5907266	13.34	0.000	6.719536	9.035142

Next, we employed the ARIMA model again, but included a variable (date) to control for the temporal trends in the data. Exhibit 17 shows that when we controlled for temporal trends, the impact of the truce we observed was no longer significant. This result indicates that it was not the truce per se that caused the decline in homicides, but instead the decline in homicides was part of a larger (local and nationwide) decline in homicides.

Exhibit 17: Results of ARIMA model with control of temporal trends.

ARIMA regression

Sample: 564 - 623

Number of obs = 60

Wald chi2(8) = 14.44

Log likelihood = -208.2031

Prob > chi2 = 0.0710

murders_rate	OPG		z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.				
murders_rate						
t_1	-9.194625	54.62116	-0.17	0.866	-116.2501	97.86088
t_2	-2.353533	4.923798	-0.48	0.633	-12.004	7.296933
t_6	.2995697	6.576644	0.05	0.964	-12.59042	13.18956
t_9	-8.844212	9.402792	-0.94	0.347	-27.27335	9.584921
t_12	-9.70747	22.28007	-0.44	0.663	-53.37561	33.96067
t_15	-.3519687	7.694691	-0.05	0.964	-15.43329	14.72935
date	-.2318963	.2091772	-1.11	0.268	-.6418761	.1780835
_cons	148.0274	119.7324	1.24	0.216	-86.64378	382.6986
ARMA						
ar						
L1.	.1270618	.1253989	1.01	0.311	-.1187156	.3728392
/sigma	7.775398	.6622814	11.74	0.000	6.47735	9.073446

We next estimated the possible displacement effects of the truce. Exhibit 18 presents the results of these models. Examination of the main effects of the truce period does not indicate any effects, and looking at the truce#Comparison interaction effects, we also do not find any displacement effects. Note that these models also controlled for the socio-demographic characteristics of each community.

Exhibit 18: Results of Panel (Town) time series model with control of temporal trends.

Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression

Coefficients: **generalized least squares**
 Panels: **homoskedastic**
 Correlation: **common AR(1) coefficient for all panels (0.2045)**

Estimated covariances	=	1	Number of obs	=	10248
Estimated autocorrelations	=	1	Number of groups	=	181
Estimated coefficients	=	17	Obs per group: min	=	48
			avg	=	56.61878
			max	=	60
			Wald chi2(16)	=	123.59
			Prob > chi2	=	0.0000

murders_rate	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
truce					
1	-12.15158	10.95699	-1.11	0.267	-33.62688 9.323715
2	-5.034368	7.123478	-0.71	0.480	-18.99613 8.927392
6	.6563019	7.86731	0.08	0.934	-14.76334 16.07595
9	-10.14276	7.881965	-1.29	0.198	-25.59113 5.305603
12	-12.62496	7.871907	-1.60	0.109	-28.05361 2.803697
15	-4.269255	4.284086	-1.00	0.319	-12.66591 4.1274
august					
Balance	-4.757021	3.276618	-1.45	0.147	-11.17907 1.665032
truce#august					
1#Balance	10.56874	11.04696	0.96	0.339	-11.08291 32.22039
2#Balance	3.498997	7.175155	0.49	0.626	-10.56405 17.56204
6#Balance	-1.703928	7.919006	-0.22	0.830	-17.22489 13.81704
9#Balance	10.42658	7.925876	1.32	0.188	-5.107854 25.96101
12#Balance	13.18516	7.903159	1.67	0.095	-2.304746 28.67507
15#Balance	5.392222	4.128863	1.31	0.192	-2.700202 13.48464
date	-.1276623	.0345659	-3.69	0.000	-.1954101 -.0599144
ses	1.245334	.2428629	5.13	0.000	.7693312 1.721336
lnpopulationdensity	1.21961	.1709831	7.13	0.000	.8844891 1.554731
_cons	6.310151	3.518738	1.79	0.073	-.5864483 13.20675

Last, we used a random effects negative binomial regression that predicted the homicide rate, with population as an exposure variable, and controlled for the socio-demographic characteristics of each community. The results are presented in Exhibit 19. The analysis showed that time had a negative effect, indicating that homicides were decreasing in all areas over the study period. The main effects of the truce (truce = 1, 2, . . .) represented the effects of the truce in the targeted area, and did not show a significant effect for any period following the gang truce. However, we did find that the homicide rate significantly increased in the

comparison areas in months 12 through 14 following the truce. In particular, we found a 29 percent increase in the homicide rate in the comparison communities for that period ($\exp(-1.797 + 2.048) = 1.285$, $p\text{-value} = 0.04$). Since this effect is only significant at the 0.05 level, however, and given the number of analyses used to examine the data, it is possible that we found this effect by chance alone.

Exhibit 19. Random Effects Negative Binomial

Random-effects negative binomial regression
 Group variable: Unique_ID

Number of obs = 10067
 Number of groups = 181

Random effects u_i ~ Beta

Obs per group: min = 47
 avg = 55.6
 max = 59

Log likelihood = -7008.2354


Wald chi2(28) = 246.06
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

murders	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
murders_rate					
L1.	.0048886	.0008711	5.61	0.000	.0031812 .006596
date	-.0203958	.0028883	-7.06	0.000	-.0260569 -.0147348
truce					
1	-.8142215	1.016442	-0.80	0.423	-2.806412 1.177969
2	-.1008925	.4005206	-0.25	0.801	-.8858985 .6841135
6	.074891	.4083976	0.18	0.855	-.7255537 .8753357
9	-.9734859	.7284264	-1.34	0.181	-2.401175 .4542035
12	-1.796664	1.015352	-1.77	0.077	-3.786717 .1933892
15	-.0505522	.2520192	-0.20	0.841	-.5445008 .4433964
august					
Balance	-.2795396	.3617976	-0.77	0.440	-.9886499 .4295708
truce#august					
1#Balance	1.03465	1.02114	1.01	0.311	-.9667474 3.036048
2#Balance	-.068369	.4059689	-0.17	0.866	-.8640534 .7273154
6#Balance	-.2970297	.414942	-0.72	0.474	-1.110301 .5162417
9#Balance	1.228827	.7306734	1.68	0.093	-.2032663 2.660921
12#Balance	2.047925	1.016446	2.01	0.044	.0557269 4.040123
15#Balance	.4184074	.234798	1.78	0.075	-.0417882 .8786029
month					
1	.1700764	.1072004	1.59	0.113	-.0400326 .3801853
2	-.0210668	.1030955	-0.20	0.838	-.2231303 .1809966
3	.0714998	.1019749	0.70	0.483	-.1283674 .271367
4	.011912	.103076	0.12	0.908	-.1901133 .2139373
5	.3984384	.0924064	4.31	0.000	.2173252 .5795516
7	.2348334	.0970938	2.42	0.016	.044533 .4251337
8	.0727472	.1026432	0.71	0.478	-.1284299 .2739242
9	.1045113	.102351	1.02	0.307	-.0960931 .3051156
10	.1656331	.1016693	1.63	0.103	-.033635 .3649012
11	.3959479	.0985549	4.02	0.000	.2027839 .589112
12	.1941865	.1028705	1.89	0.059	-.0074359 .395809
ses	-.0914282	.0507219	-1.80	0.071	-.1908413 .0079849
Inpopulationdensity	.1750189	.0391663	4.47	0.000	.0982543 .2517834
_cons	-9.015517	.4842864	-18.62	0.000	-9.964701 -8.066334
In(population)	1	(exposure)			
/ln_r	2.692983	.1601677			2.37906 3.006906
/ln_s	1.185252	.1493105			.8926092 1.477896
r	14.77568	2.366587			10.79475 20.22472
s	3.271513	.4884713			2.441492 4.383711

Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled: $\text{chibar2}(01) = 460.69$ Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000

Given these caveats, we visualized this model with the following set of marginal predictions, as observed in Exhibit 20. We saw that the targeted area (as illustrated in red) experienced an immediate decrease in homicide, which coincided with an increase in homicides in the balance of the study area. However, the target area quickly returned to “normal” and homicides in the comparison area decreased again. During months 9 through 11 following the truce, there was a reduction in homicides in the target area, with an associated increase in the comparison area. It is important to point out that the confidence intervals are large, and we cannot yield concrete conclusions from these results. However, it appears that the truce might have had a temporary short-lived displacement effect, decreasing homicides in the target area, but increasing homicides in the comparison area.

Exhibit 20: Predicted change in homicides in the target and comparison areas.



Conclusions

From 2000 through 2009, Jamaica experienced a substantial number of homicides, many of which were attributed to gangs in one form or another. Traditional law enforcement responses were repeatedly implemented, but until 2010, those had little effect. Some policymakers in Jamaica, as well as in other nations throughout the Caribbean and Central America, have recently been experimenting with novel approaches to reducing gang-related violence, notably the implementation of gang truces. In Jamaica, at least eight gang truces reportedly have been

negotiated since 2001 (Levy 2009). The Greater August Town gang truce was thought to have been one of the more successful, and it has served as a model for other communities to use (2009). Our purpose here has been to identify the actors involved in the negotiations of that truce, the negotiation goals, and the implementation methods used, and then to examine empirically the impact of that truce on homicide rates in the targeted community.

The 2008 gang truce in August Town was a response to violence that arose when the leader of one gang was killed, creating a power vacuum that other gangs saw as an opportunity to increase their influence in the community. Concomitantly, the community, as well as the gangs, feared that an absence of formal social control would result in further violence. The police reacted unevenly. At some times, they engaged in appropriate but heightened levels of preventive patrol, while at other times they purposely provided little or no protection; on occasion, they used aggressive tactics that further isolated them from the community. The end result was that there was neither stability nor predictability in the police response and, therefore, little trust in the police to address the problem.

As the violence further escalated, the community mobilized. The Jamaican Peace Management Initiative, faculty members from the University of the West Indies (UWI), the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JFC) and other community-oriented groups joined forces, seeking to reduce the increasing number of homicides by brokering a truce between the gangs. Over the three-week negotiation period, the negotiators and the gangs sought terms from one another. The gangs wanted payment, "work," and funds for micro-business development to end the violence. The third-party stakeholders wanted the gangs to disarm, actually or symbolically. Neither the gangs nor the stakeholders had substantial leverage, nor did they have much to offer one another in terms of incentives. In the end, however, a truce was agreed upon, and all of the gangs' leaders and several key community stakeholders signed it at a public ceremony with the media in attendance.

At first glance, our impact findings appeared to show that the gang truce was an effective mechanism for reducing violence. Bivariate analyses showed a significant decline in homicides after the truce was implemented. This explained the work previously published by

policymakers, researchers and news reporters. Upon further examination of the data, however, comparing change in the target and comparison areas and accounting for temporal trends, we found that the decline in homicide was part of a larger nationwide decline in violence and that the gang truce was not responsible for the decline. The only significant effect that we uncovered was that possibly the homicides were displaced outside the target area for a brief period of time, but then returned to normal.

Any one of a number of explanations might be offered for the strategy's lack of effectiveness. It might be that the Jamaican gang leaders, at least those in Greater August Town, did not have the organizational capacity to change gang member behavior. Much prior research suggests that in general gangs have limited organizational structure and little formal leadership. This might suggest that gangs do not possess the necessary capacity to regulate their members' violence. That said, gangs in Jamaica, including in Greater August Town, have been found to be fairly organizationally sophisticated and to possess strong leadership.

In fact, in a small number of Jamaican communities, gangs have been found to be highly organized, with individual gang leaders being referred to as dons and community leaders. The gang leader in such a community is often found to have substantial control over members and residents, as these communities often turn to the don rather than the police for justice. The don will hold court and punish those who commit crime. Punishment can include beatings and torture, as well as execution (Morgensen 2004). Although this level of organizational structure and sophistication is found only in a small number of Jamaican communities, generally the gangs in Jamaica are believed to have some organizational capacity, or at least enough to reduce violence in communities.

Our findings, however, indicated that prior to 2005 and the death of Neil Wright, perhaps only Jungle 12 could approximate that capacity to discipline members and enforce a truce. After the gang's fragmentation in 2005, Jungle 12 lost much of its organizational capability, and enforcement of the truce was therefore difficult. The truce negotiators sought to address the enforcement issue by proposing a peace council that would involve all parties. The proposal was approved by all key stakeholders; still, some gang leaders demanded cash payments as a

condition for attending council meetings. Peace was consistently seen by then as a bargaining tool rather than as an honest attempt to establish and maintain peace. In the end, members of only two gangs were attending the meetings²¹ and the council soon dissolved.

In an effort to replicate the council function, UWI sponsored one of the most respected negotiators, a community activist, to become a one-person monitoring and intervention specialist, or a “violence interrupter.” His job was to ensure that truce violations did not lead to a return of the gang wars — and there were many violations of the truce. For example, there were instances of gang members crossing boundaries and entering the turf of another gang armed, although not initiating conflict, behavior that was interpreted by the opposing gangs as preparation for the next round of “war” or as laying a foundation for a surprise attack that would exploit the truce for this purpose. In the absence of the council, these matters were reported to the violence interrupter, who tried to resolve the problems in consultation with the various gang leaders. Often the gang leaders were unresponsive or incapable, and therefore the threatening practices and violence continued. Ultimately, there were no rules or bodies or persons who could regulate the violence, and there were never any reference points for compliance. The formal truce agreement was an attempt to negotiate and impose such rules via a collective pressure that would include third parties, but it was unsuccessful in doing so. The potential for re-engineering norms related to conflict thus was not realized.

Another explanation for the failure of the gang truce might be that it was more a vehicle for rhetoric rather than for reality. The gang leaders insisted that they would sign the truce agreement only if it were ratified in public with the presence of the media (Jackson 2008; Levy 2009). The leaders might have viewed the process in and of itself as a means of increasing their reputation and influence within the community and in policymaking circles (and to reduce mutual distrust). In signing the truce, gang leaders publicly pledged to reduce their involvement in violence, thereby calming local residents’ fears. They also made public efforts to increase resources for their communities, perhaps in an attempt to portray themselves as “providers” to the community. In fact, the truce did provide gang leaders with an opportunity to be seen in

²¹ Interestingly, the Jungle 12 factions did not attend any of the peace council meetings.

public, collaborating with important community stakeholders. The imagery of the public signing was of the government (via the PMI) and others approaching the gang to ask them to use their means of informal social control in the community to reduce violence — to accomplish something that the government could not do on its own. As a consequence, the process may have been perceived by gang leaders as a victory because it enhanced the gangs' reputation with both the government and community.

Alternatively, from the start, the gangs might not have been fully invested in the gang truce. One of the major criticisms of the Greater August Town gang truce was that gangs were not required to give up their firearms, although some believed that this was an unrealistic request:

. . . their demand, and the demand of many, that all guns be turned in immediately was quite unrealistic, given the decades of ingrained gun culture and the continued inability of the security forces to guarantee protection for any corner against armed rivals. It was obvious to most observers that that kind of situation could not be ended overnight and that this was a reasonable first step in the process (Levy 2009, 63).

The gangs feared that if they were to disarm themselves, they would be vulnerable to other gangs and unable to protect themselves, a concern that appears not to have been addressed by mediators. Indeed, at times some elements within the community felt somewhat dependent on the gangs to maintain security. If the gangs would have been disarmed, and there were no near-term alternative prospects for any form of social control, both the gang and the community might have faced additional violence, as has been observed in the past. In the end, the gang truce only called for a reduction in gang violence and did not provide any solutions to address the larger problems between the gangs, nor did it provide the gangs with any tangible benefits for abiding by the truce.

Case Study C: Gang Truce— The Honduran Experience

Introduction

Violence in Honduras is at epidemic levels, increasing almost 44 percent over the past five years. In 2012, there were 7,172 homicides in Honduras, or about 86 homicides per 100,000 population (Instituto Universitario de Democracia, Paz y Seguridad, 2013), making it the most violent nation in the world (United Nations 2013). Likewise, Honduras' second largest city, San Pedro Sula, has the highest municipal level homicide rate in the world with 1,290 homicides (Instituto Universitario de Democracia, Paz y Seguridad, 2013), or about 174 per 100,000 population (United Nations 2013). In comparison, the average homicide rate across the globe is about 6.2 per 100,000, and the average homicide rate in Central America is about 27 per 100,000 (United Nations 2013).²²

Much of the discussion about the causes of Honduras' high homicide rate has focused on its relationship with international drug trafficking routes, gangs, and conflict between crime groups and the government, and government instability. Estimates of gang involvement vary widely, but some have suggested that there are between 12,000 (Seelke 2012) to 36,000 (Ratcliffe et al., 2014) gang members in Honduras who typically belong to one of two gangs: MS-13 and 18th Street. These gangs are said to be less organized than their counterparts in El Salvador, but are said to be just as involved in extortion and intimidation, and perhaps more involved in drug trafficking because of their stronger linkages with Mexican drug cartels (Wilkinson 2013).

²² An unusual characteristic of the homicide problem in Honduras is the age of victims. Typically, in the Western Hemisphere, homicide victims are aged 15 to 29. In Honduras, however, those 30 to 44 have the highest rate of violent victimization. For example, 1 out of 280 males 30 to 44 years old are the victim of homicide, compared to 1 out of 360 males 15 to 29 years old (United Nations 2013). These findings, by themselves, are suggestive of a chronic gang problem (Spergel 1995). Honduras also stands out in the Western Hemisphere in the proportion of its homicides that involve a firearm. In 2012, about 84 percent of the homicides involved a firearm (11). The proportion of homicides that involve a firearm appears to be increasing as well. In 2008 79% of homicides involved a firearm compared to 81% in 2009, 83% in 2010 (United Nations 2013).

Over the past decade the nation has responded with “Mano Dura” (i.e., iron fist or heavy hand). The new legislation provided the police with more authority to stop, search, and detain gang members. The new legislation also permitted the courts to sentence gang members to prison for 12 years for simply being a member of a gang; and allowed the courts to sentence individuals to even longer prison terms for gang related incidents. Concomitantly, the military joined the effort to fight gangs by patrolling neighborhoods along side the police. While the public and media strongly supported the shift in national policy toward Mano Dura, much of the evidence suggests that these legislative and policy changes were not effective, as the number of homicides continued to escalate. Some suggest that its lack of success was because gang members who were arrested were released due to lack of evidence, or those who went to prison, if they were not a gang member before entering prison, joined a gang. Other critics point out that the heavy handed approach by the government led to loss in the rule of law as vigilantes engaged in extra-judicial violence against gang members (Seelke 2012). Still others said that the legislation and policies never really had a chance of working because of the general lack of effectiveness of the police and courts, and the wide spread corruption throughout the criminal justice system (Zilberg 2011)

As a consequence of the above, policymakers and citizens voiced optimism about the possibility of a truce between gangs after initial results in El Salvador suggested the strategy might be effective (Villiers-Negroponete 2013). Honduran church leaders and the Organization of American States (OAS) began to develop a strategy to implement a similar type of truce in Honduras, and the President offered his personal support in their efforts (Arce 2013). In this case study we examine the processes that lead to the Honduras gang truce and the nationwide impact of the truce on homicides. In the below section we discuss the major stakeholders who participated in the truce, processes leading up to the truce, and the establishment of the truce.

Key stakeholders

The primary facilitator for the truce process in Honduras was Archbishop Rómulo Emiliani, who had earlier served as the Assistant Bishop of the Dioceses of San Pedro Sula, and who received

support from the Catholic Church to pursue the truce (Bosworth 2013). Prior to the negotiations he was well known for his work, which attempted to establish peace between the gangs and his advocacy for prison reform and social reintegration programs for gang members (The Daily Herald, 2013). From the onset, Monsignor Emiliani proceeded cautiously to ensure reasonable expectations among the public and policymakers. He maintained publically that “he didn’t want to be a salesman of false promises about what was going to occur in the future; the things that they do are unpredictable but we expect to have a declaration of reconciliation principles with society” (El Mundo, 2013). Additionally, he wanted to set reasonable expectations because he knew that it would be a “slow, painful and draining process” (El Nuevo Siglo, 2013) and that “What is coming is difficult. It is not easy. It is complicated” (Castillo 2013).

As in El Salvador, the Organization of American States (OAS) played a major role in facilitating the peace process, alongside Monsignor Emiliani. Adam Blackwell served as the Secretary of Multidimensional Security for the OAS and represented Canada on the Honduras Security Reform Commission (Willcocks 2014). His participation in the mediation process was requested by Honduran gang members who were in prison. They requested that the OAS help broker a peace agreement with the Honduran government and to help identify resources that would assist gang members to obtain legitimate jobs (Associated Press, 2013). The OAS together with the Catholic Church served as a “bridge” between the executive branch of the government and the two gangs. Additionally, two of the mediators (i.e., Salvadoran Army officer and Police Chaplain Monsignor Colindres and former Salvadorian congressman Mijango) who helped broker the truce in El Salvador provided additional support to Monsignor Emiliani and Secretary Blackwell. They traveled to Honduras to present their experiences with the gang truce in El Salvador and to convey that a gang truce is a promising and legitimate strategy for addressing gang violence (Associated Press 2013).

Gang leaders of the two primary gangs in Honduras (MS 13 and 18th Street) also participated extensively in the negotiation process. It was stated that they had become weary of the violent conflict and understood that a truce would be beneficial to the Honduran people (Servellon

2013). From the beginning, however, a number of the critics of the truce argued that Honduran gangs did not have the capacity to control street level violence. They characterized the Honduran gangs as having less organizational leadership (Bosworth 2013), less control over turf (LatinNews Daily Report, 2013), and being more organizationally fractured (Dudley 2013) than MS 13 in El Salvador.

At the time that discussions about the possibility of a gang truce began President Porfirio Lobo Sosa was publically supportive of the Catholic Church and OAS negotiating with the gangs. Media reports quoted the President saying I am “prepared to do what ever is necessary” to support the mediators (Phillips 2013), “We have to look for anything that’s an alternative to violence...On the part of the government, we are open to any process that can lower violence” (Associated Press 2013), and that he had given “his blessing to Emillani’s efforts to broker peace between the gangs...” (The Daily Herald 2013). However, in November 2013, after a general election, the new president, Juan Orlando Hernández, through his recently appointed Vice Minister of Security, declared that the government would no longer support the truce process with the gangs (El Heraldo 2014). Since then, the Government of Honduras has not mentioned the peace process that was initiated in May 2013.

Truce making process

It is important to note that prior to the announcement of the gang truce a number of key stakeholders were somewhat skeptical about its possibility. On the one hand, some suggested that a gang truce had been attempted in the past with no success. For example, one stakeholder commented to an international media outlet that “Everyone here agrees it’s a positive step forward but people are cautiously optimistic because in 2005, these two gangs had another peace treaty with each other. Now that treaty was very tentative, it only lasted less than two months” (Al Jazeera, 28, May, 2013). On the other hand, as noted above, other stakeholders believed that the local gangs did not have enough organizational leadership to change the behavior of gang members to reduce violence (Bosworth, 2013). They argued that even if gang leaders wanted a gang truce there was no way of enforcing it on the streets.

Several months prior to the announcement of the gang truce Carlos Mojica Lechuga, an 18th Street Salvadorian gang leader, publically stated that representatives of MS13 and 18th Street in Honduras spoke with several gang truce key stakeholders in El Salvador for the purpose of replicating the truce in Honduras. Tellingly, in reflection of the visit Mojica noted that the advantage of a gang truce is that it formally recognizes Honduran MS13 and 18th Street leaders as important political persons within the nation. He also noted that Honduran gang leaders have historically been treated poorly and that a gang truce holds the potential for demonstrating the political power of each of the Honduran gangs (Villiers Negroponete 2013).

The negotiators used different language to describe the early days of the truce. Specifically, they mentioned that there had been a consultative process with the gang leaderships, so they were in "a process like lighting".²³ Prior to the truce media sources mentioned that the gang leaders were offering to stop violence and to not recruit more youth into the gangs.²⁴ The gang leaders also spoke about the "persecution" they and their family members had suffered during the previous years; highlighting that they had been prohibited social opportunities offered to others in society (Arce 2013).

Leading up to the negotiations, the leadership of both gangs expressed their interest in three goals: 1) lowering violence and crime, 2) reconciliation with God, society, and the government, and 3) helping to improve the social conditions of their communities. Although there was not written documentation on the exact agreement between the parties, one MS-13 leader affirmed that the pact would include all violence (El Comercio 2013). However, when talking about sensitive topics such as extortions, which is one of the main sources of income for the gangs, the gang leader said that "would be taken up at a later date" (ABC Internacional 2013). Leaders of 18th street made similar general statements about ending violence, but they were more specific about their demands. One of the 18th Street leaders stated that "what we want is

²³ El Universal 2013 - <http://www.eluniversal.com/internacional/130531/obispo-hondureno-descarta-tregua-entre-las-pandillas>.

²⁴ (Garcia 2013 - <http://www.laprensa.hn/csp/mediapool/sites/LaPrensa/Honduras/SanPedroSula/story.csp?cid=338546&sid=276&fid=98->)

to have a dialog with any commission appointed by President Porfirio Lobo and we are sure that the situation in Honduras will begin to change” (El Nuevo Siglo 2013).

Establishing the gang truce

On May 28th, 2013, with public declarations from leaders of both gangs, the gang truce was announced. From the beginning of the process, the role of the government in the truce was unclear (La Prensa 2013). Likewise, there was little discussion about the exact nature of the agreement, the terms in which gang members would abide, and any benefits that would be made available to those who participated in the truce. For example, as one stakeholder indicated, the government never decisively considered viable proposals to give the members of the gangs any opportunities. It is important to note that none of the parties signed a formal commitment, and neither MS-13 nor 18th Street signed any type of ceasefire agreement. The gang leaders were in separate locations and were never in direct contact with each other during the announcement. That is, both gangs seemingly agreed to the gang truce without ever talking to each other. The “peace process” was publicly announced on May 28, 2013 through “joint but separate” declarations made by the leaders from both gangs, imprisoned in the San Pedro Sula prison (National Penitentiary SPS) (The Daily Herald 2013). The national and international media widely covered the declarations.

The MS-13 leaders said they would not commit any more homicides or any other types of crimes. They ensured that this was an “immediate” order and would be effective throughout the country. They emphasized, “all of the boys know what they have to do starting today” (Pachico 2013). The leadership of 18th Street declared that they would stop violence and other criminal activities, but also indicated that the government would have to “listen to them”.

Little research has examined whether the gang truce in Honduras ever impacted violence in the nation. Instead anecdotes have been used to portray its effectiveness. One facilitator for example indicated, “in Honduras the dialog with the gangs has been positive, however the sad thing in Honduras is that the two main gangs have not accepted a truce between them, they just haven’t accepted it as yet” (La Prensa 2013), despite the fact that – in their own words –

“they do want to hold a dialog with society, with the government, and with the police.”

Conversely, gang leaders declared that the truce had been effective. For example, a leader of 18th Street noted that “...It has already done its part, telling members in the areas the gang controls to stop the violence and crime...[estimating] crime had already dropped 80 percent in those areas” (Associated Press, June 17, 2013). Similarly a member of MS13 estimated that violence in MS13 controlled areas declined by 45 percent (Associated Press, June 17, 2013). As a symbolic gesture of the impact of the truce MS13 leaders also noted that as a gesture of good will they made and delivered 60 beds for a nursery home in San Pedro Sula (Associated Press, June 17, 2013).

Methods

For the present case study we used a pre-test post-test, longitudinal quasi experimental design. Data from the 2001 Honduran Census was obtained from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). These data provided municipal level measures of number of residents, population density per kilometer, percent of population who moved in from another municipality, ethnicity, percent urban, number of residents immigrated to the United States, percent female headed households, percent unemployed, age composition, income, percent of households rented, and education level. In addition, population projections for the years 2005, 2010, and 2014 were also obtained from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). The population levels for the total population, as well as the percentage of residents in a municipality that rural and percentage of residents who are female were linearly interpolated for the intervening years. Examination of the observed levels indicated that growth was linear overall, and so we feel confident that our linear interpolations are good approximations. Second, we used municipal level homicide data by month and year for the period May 2012 through July 2014. These data were provided by the Honduran National Police, through the Honduran U.S. Embassy. Both datasets were merged for the present analysis.


Measures

The dependent variable for the Honduran case study is the monthly homicide rate, which was calculated by dividing the number of homicides in each municipality by its population, and multiplying this figure by 100,000. We examined change by comparing the homicide data 13 months prior to the gang truce to the homicide data 14 months following the truce in each of the nation's 298 municipalities. As presented in Exhibit 21 there were a total of 7,910 homicides over the study period, with each municipality averaging 183 homicides (sd=837). A trend analysis showing the monthly number of homicides on a national level prior to and following the gang truce is presented in Exhibit 22. It shows that nationally the homicide rate gradually declined over the study period.

Exhibit 21. Summary Statistics

	Pre-Truce (n=3,809)		Post-Truce (n=4,101)		Total (n=7,910)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Homicide	200	900	166	773	183	837
Population	28744.92	86746.59	29395.57	88702.67	29082.26	87761.24
Homicide rate	5.21	9.53	4.13	8.14	4.65	8.85
Density	99.26	108.78	99.28	108.78	99.27	108.77
Born in the same municipality	82.11	12.86	82.11	12.86	82.11	12.86
Other population group	85.45	23.90	85.45	23.9	85.45	23.90
Percent rural	79.26	27.32	78.99	27.62	79.12	27.48
Living in another country	3.31	6.50	3.31	6.5	3.31	6.50
Socioeconomic status	0.05	0.97	-0.02	1.02	0.01	1.00

Exhibit 22: Homicide rate in Honduras by month



We used census data to control for several community-level structural factors. Principal components analysis was used to reduce some of the data into a summary measure. Exhibit 23 presents the results of the component loadings. One component was extracted that we labeled socio-economic status (SES). This component exhibited high loadings for percent female headed household, percent unemployment, and percent completing primary education. Population was used as our exposure variable, and population density (per 1 km), residential stability, percentage of the population that is rural, percentage of the population that is indigenous (verify), and the number of residents immigrated to the United States served as our control variables. Population density and outmigration were logged to address skewness in these two measures.

Exhibit 23. Factor Analysis for Socioeconomic Status

Eigenvalue	2.36093
Variables	Factor Loadings
% Female-Headed Households	0.7977
% Unemployed	0.9269
% Primary Education	0.9303

Findings

The results of our t-test analysis are shown in Exhibit 24. It shows that there was a significant decline in the homicide rate at the municipal level before and after the gang truce. The homicide rate prior to the truce was 6.97 per 100,000 population and following the truce the homicide rate was 5.66 homicides per 100,000.

Exhibit 24. T-test on National Data by Month (n= 27 Months)

Homicide Rate	Pre Truce	Post Truce	Change
Mean	6.972346	5.663592	-1.308754 ***
SE	0.1677361	0.1151668	0.2009224

*** $p < .001$

Next, we examined the effect of the truce through ARIMA regressions. The first model in Exhibit 25 does not include an effect of the temporal trend. In this model we again find that homicides declined significantly in the period following the truce. We then employed the ARIMA model again, but this time included a variable (month) to control for the temporal trends in the data. Model 2 in Exhibit 25 shows that when we controlled for temporal trends, the impact of the truce we observed was no longer significant. Our findings suggest that homicide did not decline as a consequence of the gang truce, but instead the decline in homicides was part of a longer term historical trend that was independent of the truce.

Exhibit 25. Results from the ARIMA Models (n= 27 Months)

Homicide Rate	Model 1			Model 2		
	Effect	SE	Sig.	Effect	SE	Sig.
Truce	-1.309	0.350	***	-0.906	0.595	
m2				-0.623	0.481	
m3				-0.153	1.447	
m4				-0.074	0.607	
m5				-0.104	0.450	
m6				-0.050	0.466	
m7				-0.002	0.516	
m8				0.003	0.404	
m9				0.024	1.633	
m10				-0.396	0.522	
m11				-0.754	2.424	
m12				0.837	0.366	
Time				-0.030	0.047	
Intercept	6.973	0.254	***	7.258	0.472	***
Autocorrelation Coefficient	0.010	0.408		0.111	0.249	

*** $p < .001$

Last, we used a fixed effects multi-level negative binomial regression to predict the homicide rate, with population as an exposure variable, and controlled for the socio-demographic characteristics of each community. The results are presented in Exhibit 26. The only significant variable in the analysis was the impact of municipal level population stability. Specifically, we found that homicide rates increased in areas where residential mobility was high. Once again, our analysis showed that time had a negative effect, indicating that homicides were decreasing in all areas over the study period. The gang truce itself was unrelated to the decline in homicides.

Exhibit 26. Results from the Multilevel Negative Binomial Models (n= 27 Months)

Homicide Rate	Model 1		Model 2	
	Effect (SE)	Sig.	Effect (SE)	Sig.
Fixed Effects				
Homicide Rate	0.004 (0.002)		0.004	*
Truce	-0.119 (0.073)		-0.129 (0.072)	
Time	-0.008 (0.005)		-0.007 (0.005)	
Month 1	0.024 (0.059)		0.024 (0.059)	
Month 2	-0.107 (0.062)		-0.107 (0.062)	
Month 3	-0.041 (0.063)		-0.041 (0.063)	
Month 4	-0.033 (0.065)		-0.033 (0.065)	
Month 5	-0.002 (0.067)		-0.002 (0.067)	
Month 6 (reference)				
Month 7	0.027 (0.051)		0.027 (0.051)	
Month 8	0.023 (0.057)		0.023 (0.057)	
Month 9	0.036		0.036	

	(0.056)		(0.056)	
Month 10	-0.051		-0.051	
	(0.057)		(0.057)	
Month 11	-0.031		-0.031	
	(0.058)		(0.058)	
Month 12	0.187	***	0.187	***
	(0.056)		(0.056)	
Born in the same municipality			-0.013	***
			(0.003)	
Pecent rural			-0.003	
			(0.002)	
Socioeconomic status			0.029	
			(0.044)	
Percent dominant population			0.001	
			(0.002)	
Density (ln)			-0.010	
			(0.050)	
Living in another country (ln)			0.001	
			(0.061)	
Intercept	-10.042	***	-10.051	***
	(0.061)		(0.058)	
ln(Alpha)	-2.368	***	-2.367	***
	(0.148)		(0.148)	
Random Effects				
Var(Truce Effect)	0.066		0.066	
	(0.024)		(0.025)	
Var(Intercept)	0.388		0.309	
	(0.049)		(0.042)	
Cov(truce effect, intercept)	-0.024		-0.006	
	(0.027)		(0.025)	

*** p< .001

Conclusions

Violent crime in Honduras is widespread. With a homicide rate of about 86 per 100,000 population, Honduras is one of the most violent nations in the world (United Nations 2013). This compared to an average homicide rate around the world of 6.2 per 100,000 people and about 27 per 100,000 in Central America (United Nations 2013). Given the high rate of violence in Honduras, it is clear that new and innovative ways of reducing violence should be considered. This case study gave an overview of the implementation and impact of the gang truce experience in Honduras in 2013.

The goal of the truce was to significantly reduce the number of homicides. In order to assess the impact of the gang truce in Honduras, a pre-test post-test, longitudinal quasi-experimental design was used. Census and homicide data were merged at the municipal level to assess whether the truce had an impact on homicides, controlling for population characteristics and the natural trend in violent crime.

Overall, the findings suggest that while the homicide rate in Honduras was on a slight downward trend, the gang truce itself was unrelated to any homicide reductions. That is, the gang truce had no measurable impact on homicides in Honduras. Given the drastic reductions achieved in El Salvador, and the fact that Honduras' gang truce was a replication of El Salvador's, the following discussion will examine two important differences between the two countries gang truces. First, the implementation of the truce in Honduras did not appear to obtain trust between all parties involved and did not achieve any notable, short-term deliverables. That is, the implementation was not robust. Second, some suggest that the gangs in Honduras do not have the organizational sophistication to be able to control their members on the streets, rendering them incapable of carrying out any truce agreements.

First, the implementation of the truce in Honduras did not appear robust. The communication between the parties was weak and none of the parties completed any significant actions as part of the truce. The Catholic Church and OAS served as the bridge between the two main gangs in Honduras, MS13 and 18th Street, and the executive branch of the government. The "peace

process,” as it was called in Honduras, was initiated in May 2013. After the general election in November 2013, the newly appointed administration declared that it would no longer support the truce process with the gangs. As a result, the truce was short-lived and the governmental support for the effort shifted with the change in leadership.

Though the negotiations were largely based on the good will of a well-respected negotiator, few tangible incentives were offered during the process. The negotiations, from the beginning, involved discussions about large scale social programming. Given the short time frame, these goals, in hindsight, were unrealistic. Naturally, there was little trust between the parties at the beginning of the negotiations, and without any quick, tangible deliverables from either side, the truce never really materialized.

The second challenge to implementing a successful gang truce in Honduras might have been related to the nature of the gangs themselves. It was unclear whether the gangs possessed the level of cohesion and hierarchical leadership required to make some measures feasible. If the gangs do not have the organizational capacity to control their members on the streets, any agreements that come from the negotiations would be difficult to implement. In the earlier case study of the Salvadorian experience, it was suggested that the successes in that country were related to one of the gang’s organizational capacity to impose control of its members. The gangs in Honduras might be different. There is at least some evidence that MS 13 in Honduras might have less organizational leadership (Bossworth 2013), less control over turf (Latin News Daily Report, 2013), and have been more organizationally fractured (Dudley 2013) than their counterparts in El Salvador. The gang’s ability to operate as an efficient organization can greatly impact the outcome of the truce process. In general, we know that gangs do not have very high levels of organizational sophistication (Decker, Katz, and Webb, 2008; Decker, Bynum, Weisel, 1998). It might be that gangs in Honduras are more the norm, in terms of organizational capacity.

In summary, the 2012 truce negotiations in Honduras did not produce any measurable reductions in the homicide rate. The gangs wanted to speak to Honduran society and they even

preferred to speak with the governmental authorities but they never interacted with either. The negotiation process seemed to end as quickly as it started. The gangs did not deliver with lower rates of violence and the government did not provide social programs. It would be safe to say that a robust gang truce did not materialize in Honduras. The implementation of the truce seemed to struggle for two primary reasons. First, the mediators were not able to accomplish any quick wins to build trust between the parties involved. The commitment level on all sides was not clear throughout the process. Second, it is not clear whether the gangs in Honduras have the organizational capacity to control members on the street, as would be required to carry out an effective gang truce. In short, the 2013 gang truce in Honduras was unsuccessful.

Conclusions, Policy Implications and Recommendations

The purpose of this report was to systematically examine the effectiveness of gang truces. Gang truces have been widely implemented but rarely evaluated. Of those gang truces that have been evaluated, little attention has been given to why and how they came into existence. In this report we reviewed prior research on gang truces, and presented case studies of gang truces implemented in El Salvador, Jamaica, and Honduras for the purpose of understanding the negotiation processes undertaken with and between gangs and other stakeholders. We were interested in identifying the actors involved in the negotiations, the goal(s) of the negotiations, and the strategies employed to carry them out. Most importantly, however, we wanted to determine whether the gang truce resulted in a reduction in the number of homicides. Each case study offers lessons learned that are unique to their particular circumstances, and when considered together provide direction to policymakers on the benefits and risks of implementing gang truces.

The case studies presented here constitute the most comprehensive evaluations of gang truces to date. Existing documents were used to collect information about the processes associated with each gang truce. Many of these documents included such items as peer reviewed articles, books, and reports. The majority of these documents were collected over the Internet, requesting documents from those close to the truce, and searching library databases. Related, the case studies made use of articles obtained from local newspapers. The newspaper articles were not only intended to provide a historical record of the development of each gang truce, but also to provide additional insight into the various external forces that might have impacted the gang negotiations. Because the newspaper serves as a forum for the community to speak about its concerns, newspaper articles also provided a rich source of data on how those in the community felt about the gang truce. Accordingly, the newspaper articles offered a different view of the problem and offered different opinions as to how a gang truce should or should not be implemented. We also conducted a small number of in-depth qualitative interviews with key informants. These data were collected to supplement existing documents and to clarify issues associated with the negotiation processes. This included, but was not limited to,

questions pertaining to identifying the actors involved in the negotiations, the goal(s) of the negotiations, and strategies employed to carry out negotiations. The interviews were intended to obtain information from those who possessed first hand knowledge about the gang truce in each nation.

We examined the impact of each truce using official data. We first performed a simple t-test comparing the homicide rates before and after the truce. However, as discussed above, this technique has limitations. The most severe of which is that even if the test was significant, it would be difficult to determine whether the difference was due to the gang truce or a natural change over time in the outcome. We addressed this limitation by using time series models whereby the homicide rate for the community was modeled as a function of time, with truce period indicators included to measure the effect of the truce net of the temporal trends. These models were estimated with ARIMA techniques. Supplemental models were also employed to examine and control for factors other than the truce that might have impacted homicide over the study period.

Summary of Findings Related to the Implementation of a Gang Truce in the Three Sites

We found that the implementation of gang truces have a number of common characteristics. The first is that in each case a community was experiencing an uncharacteristically high number of gang related homicides over a fairly lengthy period of time. The continued high level of violence, in each case, resulted in the community placing strong pressure on the government in general and the justice system in particular to respond to the problem quickly and effectively. In each case, they had first attempted to control gang violence through suppression oriented strategies, and these strategies were found to be ineffective over the intermediate and long term. In turn, each community's inability to exercise traditional informal and formal social control to decrease levels of violence became self evident to the public and government. This resulted in both the state and community to seek (or participate in) an alternative strategy in which negotiators would formally and/or informally work with gang leaders to establish a truce that would reduce gang homicide.

Key stakeholders involved in the negotiation and establishment of each gang truce were fairly similar. In each of the cases examined the gang leaders of the largest and most violently involved gangs were willing to consider participating in negotiations that could lead to a truce. In each of these cases it was clear that the gangs not only sought to collaborate with the negotiators for the purpose of reducing violence, but perhaps more importantly were seeking a means in which to gain greater, more positive recognition in the community and to reap some form of benefit to themselves, their members, and possibly their community. In each case, while not always formally involved, government officials were at a minimum made aware of negotiations, and in some cases solicited the assistance of third party's to broker an agreement between stakeholders. In each case it was at least implicitly understood that the government would "listen" to the gang leader's expectations of the government and what they—the gang leaders—had to offer in exchange. We found that when the government was no longer willing to "listen" to or collaborate with negotiators the truce processes ended abruptly. Negotiators were typically comprised of a very small group (i.e., 2-3) of individuals who were perceived to be "honest brokers." In El Salvador and Honduras this included a high ranking Catholic Church official, a leader from an international diplomatic organization (i.e., OAS), and other neutral parties. In Jamaica this included a quasi-governmental organization that had been established for the purpose of brokering negotiations between gangs to reduce violence and the local university, which had access to staff who were perceived to be neutral but had an interest in reducing violence due to its proximity to the university.

The strategies used to execute each gang truce were similar but yet importantly different. They were similar in that each involved a team of negotiators working to identify common goals to be achieved and identifying tangibles that could be delivered to the gang leaders, gang members, and their community in exchange for the gang achieving their stated goals. They were different, however, in terms of the structure of the delivery of each parties promise to the other. In Honduras and Jamaica it appears that gang leaders committed to reducing gang violence in exchange for general promises made by the negotiators, for example, that substantial public works programs would be implemented for the goal of reducing unemployment among gang members and the community. In both of these cases it required

the government to develop and deploy large scale social programming in a very quick period of time—something that neither government had a strong record of demonstrating. In El Salvador negotiators employed a strategy of the gang leaders promising to deliver immediate changes in gang member behavior for immediate administratively natured changes by the government. For example, in exchange for a reduction in gang violence the government agreed to relocate imprisoned gang leaders to less restrictive prisons and provide them some privileges. Following the successful execution of the first part of the truce, which resulted in near term success for both parties, they began to negotiate issues that would take a longer period of time for the gangs and government to deliver. Our findings suggested that some promised deliverables need to be easily and quickly delivered early in the process so that trust increases between both parties. Stakeholders only have a brief period of time to provide promised benefits before trust is lost, and that tangible benefits need to be delivered in weeks or months, not years.

Summary of Findings Related to the Impact of Gang Truces in the Three Sites

Our findings suggest that El Salvador's gang truce had a significant and dramatic impact on the homicide rate. The mean number of monthly homicides declined from about 354 prior to the truce to about 218 following the truce, for a net decrease of about 136 homicides per month. Our forecast showed that between March 2012 and June 2014 the truce had saved about 5,501 lives. However, there was no significant change between the pre-truce and post-truce periods in the number of thefts, extortions, robberies, rapes and auto thefts/robberies. We also found that the gang truce did not result in a homogenous decline in violence across municipalities. About 61 percent of municipalities experienced a decline in homicides, but the decline in violence varied substantially between municipalities. We examined this issue further by parsing out the relative influence of the number of MS13 and 18th Street gang members on the street and in prison from each municipality. Our analyses indicated that following the truce the number of MS13 and 18th Street gang members on the street in a municipality was not significantly related to a decline in homicide, but the number of imprisoned MS13 and 18th Street gang members was associated with a significant change in homicides following the gang truce. In particular, the number of imprisoned MS13 gang members was associated with a

significant decline in homicides following the gang truce and the number of imprisoned 18th Street members was associated with a significant increase in homicides following the truce.

In Jamaica our initial findings showed that the gang truce might be an effective mechanism for reducing violence. Bivariate analyses showed a significant decline in homicides immediately after the truce was implemented. This explains the work previously published by policymakers, researchers and news reporters. Upon further examination of the data, however, comparing change in the target and comparison areas and accounting for temporal trends, we found that the decline in homicide was part of a larger nationwide decline in violence and that the gang truce was not responsible for the decline. The only significant effect that we uncovered was the possibility that homicides were displaced outside the target area for a brief period of time, but then returned to normal.

Our findings from Honduras told a similar story as Jamaica. Initial analysis showed that the number of homicides, on average, declined across municipalities following the gang truce. Specifically, the mean number of homicides declined by 1.3 per 100,000 population, with 6.87 homicides per 100,000 population, on average, occurring in each municipality prior to the truce and 5.66 homicides per 100,000 population, on average, occurring in each municipality after the truce. However, after we examined the effect of the truce through the ARIMA model, and included a variable (month) to control for the temporal trends in the data, the impact of the truce we observed in our bivariate analysis was no longer significant. Our findings, as in Jamaica, suggested that the decline in homicides was not the consequence of the gang truce, but instead the decline in homicides was part of a long term decline in homicides due to exogenous factors.

The Potential Benefits and Consequences of a Gang Truce

Over the last several years, there have been a number of naturally occurring experiments involving gang truces in a variety of nations, in various regions of the world. Findings from evaluations of gang truces are mixed. As noted above, in El Salvador the gang truce could be characterized as highly effective, at least for the two years following the truce. It is worth mentioning that even after the truce breakup, homicides rates while above truce levels

continue slightly below pre-truce levels. In Jamaica and Honduras the gang truce had no impact on violence. In Los Angeles and Trinidad there was evidence that violence decreased for at least ninety days, but then increased substantially beyond those rates observed prior to the gang truce (see the introduction section of this report for this discussion). As a consequence, it appears that the potential for long term consequences might outweigh the potential for short term benefits. Only one study site (El Salvador) demonstrated a truce having a substantial and long term impact on violence. Others, conversely, demonstrated the truce had no impact or increased violence over the long term. In fact a number of scholars have noted that gang truces are likely to result in a boomerang effect, with gang violence increasing over the long run because of enhanced cohesion within the gang (Klein 1995). Maguire (2013) notes that when government officials negotiate a truce with gangs, they might “inadvertently be acknowledging gangs as legitimate social entities” (p. 11). This in itself might increase cohesion among gangs, which has been found to be associated with increased levels of criminality (Decker et al. 2008; Klein 1971; Maguire 2013).

Further research is needed to examine how gang truces might impact group cohesion and, if it does, whether this in turn results in greater violence. Gang truces convey the well-intentioned image that violence has been addressed and policymakers are doing something about the problem, but researchers need to better understand the probability of a gang truce reducing violence, increasing violence, or having no impact. This will better position policymakers to understand the relative risks associated with these types of interventions.

Our findings also suggest that while gang truces could be an effective intervention in areas where gangs are highly structured and organized, such as El Salvador, they could be counter-productive in areas where gangs are not as structured and organized. Because the vast majority of street gangs are not well organized (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 1995), the utility of a gang truce in reducing violence might be limited. Our findings coupled with prior research suggest that gang interventions need to be tailored to the nature of the gang and its members, or it risks increasing gang violence.

Final Thoughts

Our analysis suggests that gang truces should only be used as a means of last resort, and then only under certain conditions. Given the risks associated with a gang truce, communities with high levels, or at least modest levels, of formal social control should rely on other more promising gang control strategies. Only when the state has limited or greatly reduced capacity for social control should a truce be considered. Concomitantly, a gang truce should only be considered when a community is experiencing a substantial amounts of gang violence. Communities that are experiencing minimal to modest amount of gang violence may have more to lose from the establishment of a gang truce than they have to gain. Additionally, our findings suggest that a gang truce might only be feasible when gangs are sufficiently organized to the extent that they have the capacity to regulate member's behavior. In other words, gang leaders must have the ability to reduce their member's involvement in violence for a gang truce to work. Our findings, more concisely, suggest that gang truces should only be considered when there are a great number of gang homicides, the state has limited capacity to address the problem, and gang leaders have enough informal social control over their members that they themselves can substantially control the levels of violence in their community by regulating their member's behavior.

Recommendations

Gang truces are conjunctural strategies. States who suffer from gang-related violence must establish permanent public policies for crime control and prevention. A government that considers implementing a gang truce should be aware that it cannot become the center strategy of its public policy for citizen safety.

Gang truces should only be used as a means of last resort, and then only under certain conditions. Stakeholders must determine whether a process of dialog or negotiation with gangs is legal, ethical, and feasible.

Stakeholders must anticipate demands that are likely to arise, and their response options. Some demands may be easily met, such as improved prison conditions. Others are much more difficult and amorphous, such as: community development through more integrated violence

prevention programs (such as those implemented by SolucionES in El Salvador); local economic development programs; or economic reinsertion of ex-gang members.

Stakeholders should incorporate immediately achievable and demonstrable deliverables. Long-term goals and promises are unlikely to create the trust needed to sustain a gang truce.

Stakeholders must first determine the position in which they are negotiating, the incentives that are possible to deliver, and the boundaries and limits they face. Gangs are mostly likely to trust representatives from NGOs, community-based organizations, and members of the faith based community as brokers because they are considered more reliably neutral advocates for peace. They need to understand the capacity of the government to deliver promises in a timely manner.

Governments have to make a choice about the visibility and transparency of its participation. This decision needs to be made in the context of the national and local laws, the public's expectations of transparency, and patterns of practices of the past.

Governments must be strategic in their support for truce initiatives. Some donor funded programs run by the government prohibit gang member participation; and if the government does not receive approval from the donor, it may risk the donor withdrawing its sponsorship of the program.

Governments must ensure an inter-institutional coordination for the management of truces to avoid the responsibility to be of a single government institution. It is necessary to generate or collect reliable and pertinent data that can be used to analyze and assess the process.

It is necessary to implement an effective monitoring system of the truce process, similar to that used in the full report, as it can help parties understand what is working and who is delivering on their promises. More specifically, the monitoring and truce management system should be able to identify truce violations and be prepared to respond through the use of legal and effective practices if stakeholders do not comply.

Finally, it is necessary to develop evaluations of gang truces and monitoring programs, and support violence prevention activities, local economic development activities, and pilot programs to support the reinsertion of ex-gang members into society. Clearly national governments, municipal governments, NGOs, and community-based organizations need increased capacity and resources to discourage the growth of gangs among at-risk youth. It is therefore increasingly important to create economic opportunities for gang members willing to leave the gangs and find other legal employment. Developing and sustaining those opportunities in nations with high incidences of poverty will require significant international funding.

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Appendix A: Systematic Review of the Literature

This systematic review was conducted for the purpose of understanding the processes involved in and the impact of gang truces. Systematic reviews are intended to provide a rigorous and structured review of high quality research to understand the implementation and impact of specific types of interventions. The selection criteria employed for the present study included the following:

1. The study had to examine a street gang intervention known as a gang truce or gang negotiation;
2. The gang truce had to have taken place in North, Central, or South America;
3. The manuscript had to have been published in 1990 or thereafter;
4. The manuscript had to report a crime related outcome of the intervention;
5. The study had to have employed at least a Level 2 scientific method, based on the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (Sherman et al., 1998).

The purpose of the search was to identify as many manuscripts as possible that met our inclusion criteria. This meant that the manuscript did not have to be published in a scholarly peer-reviewed journal, but could also have been published as a report by a governmental or non-governmental agency, or as a paper presented at an academic conference. Studies were included if they were conducted in the Americas and were published in English or Spanish. This meant that studies presented in Portuguese or Dutch were excluded from the study because funding was not available for the translation of manuscripts that might have been published in these languages. We also excluded studies that implemented a gang truce alongside other crime control strategies because we wanted to be able to isolate the independent processes and impacts associated with gang truces.

Our review of the literature took place in March 2014. We relied on several search strategies identified in prior systematic reviews. We first conducted an electronic search of databases using the following search terms to identify manuscripts: “Gang truce” and “Gang negotiation.”

The following five (5) databases were searched for the literature: Criminal Justice Abstracts, Google Scholar, National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) Abstracts, ProQuest Dissertation and Theses Full Text, and Web of Science. Next, we examined the bibliographies of the manuscripts that met the criteria outlined above to identify additional studies that might have been missed when reviewing online databases. Last, through Google Scholar, we conducted “forward searches” that cited previously identified eligible studies in their bibliographies.

The above process resulted in the identification of 361 manuscripts. Among these manuscripts 35 were identified as possibly meeting the inclusion criteria. The titles and abstracts of these manuscripts were reviewed and 27 were downloaded or obtained through other means for further review. Of the 27 manuscripts three were found to meet all of the eligibility criteria identified in the above methods section. The vast majority of manuscripts were excluded because of the quality of the research. Most of these documents were reports on a gang truce that were descriptive in nature. They did not provide a methodology for how data was collected, who was interviewed, or any other information that would allow the work to be replicated. Many simply relied on news reports and other anecdotal evidence. The three studies that were identified as meeting the eligibility criteria were all on the same truce that took place between the Crips and Bloods in Los Angeles, California. Exhibit 1 presents the characteristics of the eligible studies and exhibit 2 presents the methods used and findings of each study.

Exhibit 1: Characteristics of eligible studies.

Publication type	Journal article	3
	Book	0
	Government report	0
	NGO report	0
Research design	Randomized	0
	Quasi-experimental, with controls	0
	Quasi-experimental, without controls	0
	Time series	3
Location	USA	3
	El Salvador	0
	Other	0
Language	English	3
	Spanish	0

Exhibit 2: Studies of gang truces: Research design and impact findings.

Study	Location	Study Design	Target Area	Treatment	Process measures	Outcomes	Data	Statistical analysis	Reported Findings
Cotton (1992)*	Los Angeles, CA, USA	Pre-test-post test	Not specifically stated	Gang truce between Crips and Bloods	NA	Drive by shootings, gang homicides	Police recorded incidents	Change in incidents between the periods May 1 to June 15, 1991 and May 1 st June 15, 1992	165 drive by shootings versus 85 drive-by shootings, 48% decrease. Gang related homicides dropped from 26 to 10, a 62% decrease.
Ordog et al. (1993)	Los Angeles, CA, USA	Pre-test-Post test	Not specifically stated	Gang truce between Crips and Bloods	NA	Number of Gunshot wounds (GSW) per month	Emergency room admissions	Student t-tests, compared 8 months pre-truce to the three months during truce	GSW dropped from 210 per month to 130 per months. GSW derived from drive by shooting dropped from 70% pre-truce to 40% post truce.
Ordog et al (1995)	Los Angeles, CA, USA	Pre-test-Post test	Not specifically stated	12 week truce between Crips and Bloods	NA	Number of Gunshot wounds (GSW) per day	Emergency room admissions	Student t-tests, 12 months pre-truce, three months during truce, and 11 months post-truce.	Averaged 7 GSW per day in 12 months preceding truce, 4.5 GSW per day during the truce, and 12.6 GSW per day in the 11 months following the truce.

APPENDIX B. Truce Related Media Statements from El Salvador

Evolution of the Joint Statement Processes of the Gangs

To understand the process and evolution of the negotiations, below we describe how the joint statements from the gangs, the concepts of the mediators, and the official declarations of the government were publicly expressed, and have remained as such up to the end of this study.

Joint Statements

The joint statements are declarations written through the press or in digital manner that the spokespersons for the gangs have carried out with the purpose of informing the Salvadoran population and others interested in the process about their vision, decisions and considerations regarding the truce process. The first statement made by the gangs was made on March 9, 2012. Until the date of completion of this study, the gangs had issued twenty-two joint statements; below, we have commented on the main messages.

Statement # 1: March 19, 2012.

First statement in which the gangs accept responsibility for the grave acts of violence, and they criticize the attitude of the digital newspaper EL FARO and its director. They also raise the issue of the need for social and productive reintegration of its members as a condition to change from a violent scheme of life to one of peace.

The road to conversion that we have begun is the outcome of very profound analysis and discussion efforts guided by the church and civil society facilitators, which is already starting to reap good results that are beneficial for society. We are not asking to be forgiven for the faults that we have committed, only to enforce the law adequately, that we be treated as human beings, to offer us support to socially and productively reintegrate our members by giving them job and education opportunities and not be discriminated by the simple fact of being tattooed, without having committed any type of criminal act.

Statement # 2: May 2, 2012

The gangs reiterated their firm disposition to continue in the process. They thanked their bases for following their indications and informed them about the compliance of important agreements such as not causing damage to educational communities and not recruiting youths and children into gangs.

We reiterate our firm decision and are firm on the value of our words that we have stated before the facilitators and people in general... We will not be provoked by those who from the darkness are determined to make this historical process fail through actions of sabotage and attacks against some of our family members, acts that we condemn and demand that they be clarified.

To all of our members that are free and those that are held in prison, we thank them for their support, trust and discipline in having abided by our dispositions.

Second good will gesture, which consists of declaring all of the educational centers of the country both public and private as zones of peace; in other words they will no longer be considered areas of territorial dispute and will allow the teachers and students to carry out their educational activities with normalcy and the parents can be free of worries and care when they send their children to school.

Similarly we declare that from here on all forms of involuntary recruitment of minors or persons of age will be abolished.

Statement # 3: June 19, 2012, Izalco Prison

They argue positively about the benefits of the truce in statistical terms and reject the accusation that they are responsible for the increase in the issue of disappearances.

Until March 8, 2012, there was a daily average homicide rate of fourteen deaths per day caused by violence; however, since March 9, when the process began, there has been a huge drop in the indexes to an average five homicides daily where this situation has stayed this way during the 100 days that have passed since that day; this has allowed a reduction of 850 deaths which, if the agreement would not have been reached, we would be regretting these casualties. Similarly extortions have dropped by 9 percent and the hospitals have decreased their attention to persons injured from violence acts by 60 percent.

We reject any and all data manipulation which is being made by some public and private entities to hide the positive effects of this process, when they attribute to us in a malicious manner the responsibility of more than 800 persons disappeared during this period for which we urge and demand from the competent authorities a more serious study...

Statement # 4: July 12, 2012, La Esperanza Prison, Mariona.

They offer to start a disarming process and respond positively to a petition from President Funes to stop violence against women.

*... both gangs have agree to make a new good will gesture, with which we expect to reaffirm our firm conviction and will to contribute to the recovery of social peace; our gesture consists in a symbolic PARTIAL DISARMAMENT of our structures; the deposed firearms will be handed over to the General Secretary of the OAS through the facilitators
....*

In another sense, in attention to the request by the President of the Republic to stop all type of violence against women, we inform that we have already sent precise instructions to contribute positively to this request.

Statement # 5: August 10, 2012.

They reported sabotage maneuvers by the detractors of the truce and they are even accused of increasing homicides by hiring professional hit-men to commit the homicides. However, the FGR never received any report by the mediators resulting from the information in the hands of the gangs regards the mentioned acts.

We continue to await the reactions of the proposals that we presented since June 22.

We have information that during the last few days some persons have conspired with others and are acting in darkness and have orchestrated a dismal plan to sabotage the process; we know they are paying professional hit-men to elevate the rate of homicides, to wage campaigns of terror threatening different educational centers, spreading rumors to discredit the facilitators and other persons that have supported the process, and the worst thing about it [is] that these persons haven't been capable to propose anything different that could have better results other than the ones currently being produced. This leads us to conclude that their only purpose is that the country continues to bleed and continues to be at the top of the list of the most violent countries around the world.

Statement # 6: September 24, 2012. Women's Prison, Ilopango.

They reiterate their satisfaction resulting from the reduction of homicides and announce efforts to reduce extortions, an action over which there were no new pronouncements throughout the process, nor did they establish a follow-up mechanism for its implementation.

At 200 days, we are very proud of having contributed as part of the solution to reduce the violence acts in the country causing a drop in the homicide statistics from an average 14 deaths per day resulting from violence to 5.5, which is the average rate that has remained for these past 200 days. This situation has allowed that an average of 1,712 Salvadoran lives have been saved; if the average 14 deaths per day would have continued, we would be grieving this loss.

... extortions are forms of crimes [that] continue to be experienced and that afflict the Salvadoran people. We take advantage of this opportunity to inform the public that we are committed to making great efforts to reduce and eradicate this scourge same as we expect that with everyone's help, by becoming involved and opening opportunities for the youths, we can overcome this in benefit of all of the Salvadorans that are victims to this criminal practice.

Statement # 7: December 4, 2012.

First participation of the Mao-Mao, Máquina, and Mirada Lokotes 13 gangs in the joint statements. They accept the territorial implementation plan proposed by the facilitators and would be known as the Municipalities Free of Violence. Several institutions from the government contributed to this plan, as part of the actions from the Violence Prevention Management Cabinet imposed by President Funes.

We fully accept the proposal presented by the Facilitators as it represents a realistic and objective way of addressing the solution, as it outlines a road map which makes it possible to resolve the national problem in a gradual and progressive manner.

To advance on the development of the proposal, we have “privately” delivered to the Facilitators a first list of 10 municipalities where we are ready to implement the process; an average 900,000 Salvadorans live in these municipalities and would benefit from the process.

Statement # 8: January 19, 2013.

Announcing the beginning of the implementation phase of the actions agreed to with the government in the municipalities. This phase assumed a concrete agreement with government authorities to work with the mayors, gang members and communities in those municipalities. An evaluation of the results from these experiences is still pending; this would contribute to understanding better the scope of the agreement and of one part of the process.

... the beginning of the territorialization phase is to open the processes in the municipalities to enable the full recovery of social peace. We applaud the brave, responsible, enthusiastic and patriotic attitude expressed by the mayors from the municipalities of Ilopango, Santa Tecla, Sonsonate and Quezaltepeque, who will be pioneers in a process that seeks to have national coverage.

Statement # 9: January 28, 2013, La Esperanza Prison, Mariona.

Considerations regarding “Travel Advisory for El Salvador” by the U.S. State Department. According to them, the country is obliged to collaborate on this topic since the gang phenomena were imported from the North to Central America. They have issued instructions to “have greater respect” for the integrity of tourists traveling to El Salvador.

We assume that the decision to support the truce and peace process or not is a sovereign decision of the United States Government although in our opinion it is obliged to do so, as it has joint responsibility because the gang phenomena was imported from the United States to the region and it is enhanced on a monthly basis resulting from the enormous amount of deportations.

...the Salvadoran gangs have never had it in line to affect tourists and we inform them that from this moment on, we are sending precise instructions to respect their integrity even more from the moment they arrive in El Salvador in order for their visit to be as safe and pleasant as possible.

Statement # 10: March 9, 2013.

They inform about the decrease of more than 50 percent of the homicides and announce the surrender of arms to the authorities.

... in just one year, a decrease in the rate of homicides has been achieved from 68 deaths by violent causes for every 100 thousand inhabitants to a rate of 25; this represents a

decrease that surpasses 50% and places us on the average of other Latin American countries.

With the purpose of materializing facts that reaffirm our good will, we wish to inform that in the next few hours we will be voluntarily surrendering a total of 267 different types of arms and munitions to the facilitators and to the OAS to be handed over to the Salvadoran authorities.

Statement # 11: April 5, 2013, Centro Penal Oriental, San Vicente.

They offer to collaborate with the government and the communities on preventive actions, including testimony by their members at educational centers, to avoid youth gangs from entering into the schools.

Clean all of the graffiti nationwide and that some of the gang members should speak at churches and educational centers to discourage youths from entering the gangs.

Statement # 12: May 8, 2013, Centro Penal de Chalatenango.

They warn about the reasons not to politicize the electoral process and invite the candidates to debate the prevention plans and plans against violence.

... the Salvadoran gangs are committed to ensuring this peace process be successful and one way of achieving this is by not politicizing the issue; therefore, we have instructed our structures and our families to not wear any type of partisan clothing and much less become involved as activist for any party.

We urge the candidates to sit with us and have a debate, whether in a penitentiary facility or outside of it for them to talk about their prevention policies and plans against violence and to show we can help their administration to recover peace...

Statement# 13: May18, 2013, La Esperanza Prison, Mariona.

They state their position regarding the removal from office of the Minister of Justice and Public Security and the Director of the PNC, ordered by the Constitutional Chamber to President Funes.

Both the Minister and the Director of the PNC made great contributions to this country facilitating the work of Monsignor Colindres and Raúl Mijango as facilitators of this process and their legacy will be to have contributed for the Salvadorans to find intelligent and civilized ways to solve the serious problem of violence and [they] will be remembered for having transformed the face of El Salvador.

Statement # 14: September 20, 2013, Ciudad Delgado.

They encourage President Funes to continue supporting the process as a result of the announcement to finance reintegration activities through the PATI Program.²⁵ They offer to contribute in whichever government mandate is elected, recognizing that in the past they have boycotted the elections and now they encourage the participation of their members at the polls. They congratulated the process facilitating entities.

We welcome and applaud the dignified and patriotic decision of the President of the Republic for having decided to finance the PATI program with own funds in the six municipalities that had not [been] receiving funding.

To the candidates that will register to compete in February 2014 for the administration of the country for the 2014-2019 periods, we reiterate our willingness to contribute to their mandate...

In contrast with the past when we didn't give any importance to the electoral events and we even wanted to sabotage the process and were part of the electoral body that provoked abstentions but this time to strengthen democracy, we will participate and for this reason we have invited our homeboys in voting age and their families with valid identification documents to vote and nobody should stay at home and in an orderly and peaceful way make use of their citizens' rights to elect the new authorities.

Send a sincere embrace to the facilitators of the process; we reiterate our appreciation and trust and also to the eleven brave mayors, the OAS, EU, UNDP, Interpeace, ICRC, Fundación Humanitaria, AEIPES and others involved in support of the process.

Statement # 15: November 18, 2013.

This statement was issued amidst the electoral presidential campaign to be held in February 2014 in an environment with a very strong upturn of homicides, which made the number of homicides committed on a daily basis to increase to ten during the weeks prior to its publication, double what had been occurring during most of the months of the truce.

We do not have any of the problems we are being blamed for; what we do have are communication and coordination problems and a serious decline of the credibility in the process by some of our bases, influenced by the rhetoric and governmental actions.

We clarify to the Salvadorans that nothing of what has been said in the last few days by the heads of security is true. The gangs are standing firm in our commitment and we expect that the alternate mechanisms that we are creating will soon be effective and will contribute to recover the drop of homicides to the levels of the first 15 months (5.5) or more if possible.

Statements # 16 y 17: January 9, 2014.

²⁵ After the announcement from President Funes, the Embassy of the United States of America would announce the withdrawal of their support to the program.

These statements were published jointly, #17 as an annex to #16, with the purpose of reconfirming their willingness to continue in the peace process, independently of the outcomes of the February 2014 elections. Likewise, they committed to supporting the work that is being carried out in Colonia Escalón by the business entities and civil society.

... we express our complete support to the social and community initiatives that are underway at the Colonia Escalón in San Salvador and specifically in the following quadrant: to the south of the Masferrer roundabout up to the Beethoven fountains on Paseo General Escalón; to the east on the 75th avenue north; to the west by the Masferrer roundabout and Plaza Artiga and to the north the extension of the Alameda Juan Pablo II.

Statement # 18: February 17, 2014.

They refer to the serious incident that occurred during the electoral event where supposedly the PNC prevented some of the gang members from voting. They offer their support to the winner of the second electoral round, independently of the winning candidate.

We promise that we will take all the necessary steps so that incidents such as the one at La Campanera in Soyapango, Ilopango, Cuscatancingo and Apopa will not be repeated, where members of the PNC prevented some of our members from voting, intimidating and even hitting them.

We are letting you know in advance that whoever is the winner of the second electoral round will be able to count with us to continue with this Truce and Peace process.

Statement # 19: March 12, 2014.

As a result of the outcome of the second electoral round, they congratulated the winners and reaffirmed their intention to continue in the process.

The Truce and Peace Process, contrary to what the detractors forecast and affirmed saying that it was not sustainable, that they couldn't trust us and that it was a false and hypocritical process, it has already been extended for two years and more importantly, has produced results that makes it one of the most successful experiments regarding violence prevention in Latin America...

Statement # 20: April 28, 2014.

We want to remind you that 15 months went by without any dead policemen because we committed to that and consequently there was a more professional application of the police procedures. Go back to acting professionally and we will contribute by decreasing the tension that has become unleashed in the different towns and neighborhoods.

Statement # 21: June 3, 2014

This is the first statement issued during the Salvador Sánchez presidential period with regards to the end of the Funes administration. Additionally, they inform that measures are being taken

for the gang members in the territories to facilitate and support the work of the Rescue Commands (Comandos de Salvamento), which is a human assistance organization.

The most complex period to work in favor of peace in El Salvador has just closed down; those who were obliged to work in favor of peace instead fuelled it with violence and they turned away from the peace process. Evidence shows that during the last year the violence indexes increased instead of decreasing.

... in recognition of the excellent work that you (Comandos de Salvamento) do, we are already taking action and guiding our members in the territories to offer you all of the necessary facilities and support so that you can carry out your humanitarian services in an effective and timely manner.

Statement # 22: August 28, 2014.

This is the first statement since the upturn of homicides, which for four consecutive months had had a daily average of eleven homicides in El Salvador; these figures are similar to the ones that existed before the beginning of the truce in March 2012. In this statement, they announce a second phase of the process, without distinguishing the criteria for the establishment of this phase. Besides reaffirming the commitments from the first phase, they are appealing to the different social and political actors regarding the role they should play in the process.

One of the new and interesting aspects of this new statement, the last one before the closing of this report, is that they warn about the risks of the implementation of a community police scheme, and as an example for it to be correctly applied, they talk about the experiences in the municipalities of Ciudad Delgado and Santa Tecla (El Pino Community).

... we wish to inform that by own initiative we have decided that starting on Sunday, August 24 we will begin a second phase of the Peace Process that began on March 9, 2012.

... that on the momentum of the Community Police modality, be extremely careful to not cause any confrontation between the communities and the youths; where this modality has worked (on the north of Ciudad Delgado and in El Pino in Santa Tecla) is where the Police have become change agents and in support of the community; they have gained the trust of the people because trust is built step by step and not ordered or decreed.

Pronouncements by the Mediators

The only pronouncement to the nation by the mediators was issued on November 22, 2012, at the Ministry of Justice and Public Security.

The mediators proposed a mechanism to implement the measures that had been agreed upon by the gangs and the government; in this case, they used the name of Sanctuary Municipalities. The concept of the special peace zone implies a series of actions to integrate the work of institutional and community stakeholders including the gang members and the PNC (in their version of community police), and through the signing of a pact that publicly formalizes the commitments assumed by the different groups of interest.

With the objective of responding to the claims of the citizens and searching for concrete solutions to the problems that are weighing us down, the Facilitators have designed a territorialization mechanism to achieve its consolidation. The proposed mechanism consists in progressively and successively declaring the municipalities of the country as Special Peace Zones by applying the concept of SANCTUARY MUNICIPALITIES.

Below is a detail of the components that include the Salvadoran application of the SANCTUARY MUNICIPALITY concept that we propose: (A) Special Peace Zone and (B) Municipality, where they will sign a Pact for Life and Peace with the participation of the local authorities, social leaders, entrepreneurs, churches, PNC and gang members.

It goes without saying that the mediators made the proposal, and after consulting with the parties, they made it public through this pronouncement. Immediately afterward, the government announced the implementation of the Municipalities Free of Violence Plan, which is the government's version of the Sanctuary Municipalities. Accordingly, they responded to the demand of the mediators and the gangs to start working to take the agreements reached through the negotiators to the territories.

Simultaneously, the mediators and the Minister of Justice were in search of different support, from the government, asking President Funes for resources to finance or support actions through institutions like MINED, MINSAL, FISDL, or MOP; from the cooperation agencies, to obtain technical and financial assistance and to lobby with the private enterprise and well-known NGOs to convince them to participate and contribute to the process; from churches and other organizations that could cooperate in the territories making the treatment of the gang members tolerant with the neighbors from the communities; from the FMLN congressmen and women, to lobby with the other parties in support of the initiative; and so on, with all of the actors who, according to the mediators and the Minister, could contribute to the process.

Official Declarations of the Government about the Process

During more than two years of the truce, the government never made an official declaration about the process. The information that is available was obtained during press conferences, from President Funes and Minister Munguía, referring specifically to the process or within the framework of other issues that referred to the country. This is in line with a decision planned and based on the principle of “no negotiation” since the government never accepted becoming a direct and active part of the truce; instead, it accepted being a facilitator for the conditions to occur. In this sense, there are no statements, but there are declarations which, coming from high government officials, are considered official. Of the different declarations that have been presented during the process, we identified two that were relevant.

We asked ourselves why we were working so hard on prevention and we weren't getting any results, and it was because most of our efforts were aimed at how we do things traditionally as this is how it should be done, and take the government's social plans to the communities where there is poverty . . . which traditionally have been the roots of crime and we hadn't realized that crime had scaled up while we were trying to attack the causes and we already had a war going on . . . Therefore, to make prevention in the

middle of a war doesn't result in anything. So, for all these government prevention measures to be effective on the development of its plans, we needed to stop this war. This is why I say the truce is not a solution, but without a truce there was no solution."²⁶

The above declarations made in November 2012 explain the logic with which the government took the decision to intervene by means of a truce on gang warfare to stop the war and achieve effectiveness on its preventive plans. This acknowledges the fact that it was the government's decision and was a necessary condition to find the solution for the violence problem.

The other declarations made in December 2013 are by President Funes, who refers to the state of continuity or breaking the truce:

*The truce is not broken; there are less homicides and extortions despite the bodies that have been found in clandestine cemeteries. So far, the homicides have stated at 6.8 and 6.9 % per day, but these are acts committed by gang members that have ignored the directives of the gang leaders to stop all violent actions. This included in a report sent by Monsignor Fabio Colindres about some gang leaders that have not complied with the agreed pact.*²⁷

Four months later he declared the following:

*Unfortunately, since this is a truce signed by gangs and not by the government and the gangs, it has certain fragility as it depends on the will of the gangs. One of the gangs decided to break the truce, or at least they decided to stop complying with the acquired commitments: Barrio 18 (...) are the ones that are killing and the homicides have increased.*²⁸

In these declarations, it is clear that the President recognizes that they do not have control over the mechanisms that the government has been supporting for the reduction of violence, as derived by the declarations from Minister Munguía.

²⁶ Declarations made to the Contrapunto newspaper in November 2012.

²⁷ Declarations made in his radio program the last week of December 2013.

²⁸ Declarations made during press conferences in mid-April 2014.

APPENDIX C: AUGUST TOWN FIVE-YEAR PEACE AGREEMENT

- Being fully respectful of August Town Community’s strong desire for peace
- Attentive to the need of children for a safe environment in order to receive a proper education and develop their talents
- Convinced that tolerance of the beliefs of one another is the road to be followed
- Looking forward to the implementation of plans being drafted by the University of the West Indies for August Town to be a University Town
- Conscious of our obligations to the wider society and their apprehensions about the high levels of crime in August Town
- Believing that the amount of lives lost over the last 15 years due to gang violence has set back the social and economic development of the community.
- Eager to reduce the unemployment rate in the community by allowing persons to freely and safely move around or leave the community to seek employment.

We the leaders and representatives of the various corners or sections of August Town, in spite of our differences of various kinds, do hereby formally agree to put an end to all disputes and conflicts for a period of 5 years and we set out the Rules that will govern the conduct of this Agreement.

We enter into this agreement among ourselves and with our signatures as leaders and the signatures of key stakeholders and supporters of peace and development for August Town.

RULES OF THE FIVE-YEAR PEACE AGREEMENT

1. All leaders must be truthful with each other: your word is your word.
2. There is to be free movement of all persons across all boundaries and corners regardless of reputation or affiliation to a particular corner.
3. Guns are not to be brandished – they must not be seen at any time.
4. There must be no intimidation or threat to persons from any corner.
5. No gun salute or any other forms of shooting is to take place in the community for a period of at least 5 years.
6. Corner Leaders have a responsibility to guide and counsel corner members away from domestic violence, theft, extortion, carnal abuse, rape and other wrong doing.
7. Respect and tolerance must be shown for the political beliefs of others.
8. No person should be criticized, abused or labeled as an “informer”.

9. A PEACE COUNCIL with representatives from every corner is to be established and will meet monthly to monitor adherence to these rules and the development and temperature of the community. The Peace Agreement will be reviewed every six months at a meeting of the Council and key stakeholders. It is also expected that the ability of Council members to deal with conflicts will be enhanced by training received in the areas of Mediation, Conflict Resolution, Anger Management etc.

10. If this Agreement is violated, the leaders of the corners involved hereby commit to make good faith efforts to defuse the matter and if such efforts fail an emergency meeting of the Peace Council is to be convened. Where such efforts fail or are unsuccessful, the community agrees to call in the Peace Management Initiative to facilitate their discussion.

We agree to play our part this 24th day of June 2008 at the Mona Bowl August Town, St. Andrew.

Signed By:

.....

Name:

Corner: African Gardens (Vietnam)

.....

Name:

Corner: Jungle 12

.....

Name:

Corner: Gold Smith Villa (Gola)

.....

Name:

Corner: Colour Red (Judgement Yard)

.....

Name:

Corner: Bedward Gardens (River)

.....

Name:

Corner: Peace Management Initiative

.....

Name:

Corner: August Town Minister's Fraternal

.....

Name:


Corner: University of the West Indies

.....

Name:

Corner: August Town Sports and Community Development Foundation

APPENDIX D: TIME LINE EL SALVADOR GANG TRUCE



APPENDIX E. SOCIAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROGRAMMING

SolucionES' primary violence prevention activities include working with youth of different ages to engage them in activities that allow them to develop a variety of life skills, including skills to address interpersonal and interfamilial violence. Other SolucionES primary social violence prevention programs strengthening schools as community centers for violence prevention and assist community-based organizations (CBOs) to directly address violence risk factors. SolucionES secondary violence prevention activities include helping at-risk youth find employment so that gang membership is not the only income option for youth, as youth employment can have a long-lasting impact on crime.

There are a variety of very creative NGO, donor-sponsored, and private sector violence prevention programs being implemented in the Northern Triangle, and much of the efforts in Mexico and Central America have been sponsored by donors like USAID²⁹ and the German government.³⁰ For example, the USAID/Honduras Crime and Violence Prevention Program and the USAID/Mexico Violence Prevention Program have recently begun to implement a violence prevention program focused on youth identified using a risk assessment tool developed in Los Angeles to craft tailored interventions with the youth and his/her family; this type of program will likely be replicated in El Salvador by the USAID/El Salvador Crime and Violence prevention program there as well as SolucionES. SolucionES, through its Sanando Heridas Program implemented by SolucionES Alliance member Glasswing is helping victims of violence admitted to emergency rooms cope with violence in non-retaliatory ways. Esbensen and Osgood, 1997 provide a review of the assumptions, issues, and effectiveness of gang and violence prevention strategies.

Evaluations of violence and gang prevention programming show impacts on the reduction of the likelihood that at-risk youth, of both sexes, will join gangs. Several programs have also proved effective at reducing intra- and interfamilial, non-gang related violence, e.g., the implementation of family counseling and municipal conflict resolution centers. These programs at times include coping strategies to reduce the risk of assault. Indeed, SolucionES is assessing new policy and behavioral options to reduce the extent of violence in urban and inter-urban buses, as more than 30% of assaults and robberies occur on buses, at bus terminals, at bus stops, or on the way to or from bus stops.³¹

However, almost universally violence and gang prevention programs do not enable youth or communities to negotiate intra and intercommunity violence with gangs, and therefore, they do

²⁹ USAID has implemented several successful violence prevention programs in El Salvador, notably the El Salvador Crime and Violence Prevention Program (2010-2013), the Guatemala Crime and Violence Prevention Program (2011-2014), and the current El Salvador Crime and Violence Prevention Program, initiated in 2013.

³⁰ For example, GIZ is currently implementing in El Salvador the Prevenir violence prevention program.

³¹ This study, being conducted by FUSADES, with SolucionES/USAID funding will be published in early 2015.

not directly address the levels of current violence, in particular, homicides. Unfortunately, violence prevention personnel are often the targets of gangs, and while infrequent, staff members have been kidnapped and killed.

ISBN: 9789996149306

SOLUCIONES

